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Preface
This monograph was originally conceived as one volume but is
here presented as two. The first contains a discussion of, and
detailed comparison between, the two published editions of
Wittgenstein’s "Notes on Logic". It also contains tables and
concordances by which the published editions may be compared
with one another, and to four scripts of the work which are still
extant. The second volume provides the reader with a
typographical representation of each of these four scripts in its
entirety and made available in published form for the first time.
Examination of these scripts supports the arguments concerning
provenance and chronology in the first volume.
The reason for the separation of these two intimately related
parts is that the second volume is being simultaneously
published as an electronic text, in support of the objectives of
The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen to
provide primary texts in this format. Readers may therefore
either avail themselves of the numerous possibilities associated
with the electronic medium, or use the typographic presentation
of the second volume in traditional book form.
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Editorial Preface to Volume 2
Parallel to this paper edition, Wittgenstein’s "Notes on Logic"
are also being issued in electronic format. This double-release
marks the beginning of an ambitious publication plan. In the
course of the coming years Wittgenstein’s entire Nachlaß will be
made available as machine-readable text. Correctly employed,
this medium is sufficiently flexible to satisfy the needs of
everyone from the casual browser to the most demanding
scholar.
The advantages of a well prepared electronic edition are
numerous. Text can be presented, either on a computer screen
or as paper printout, in a range of different styles, with or
without cross-references and footnotes, as a simplified reading
version or with all the variant readings and false starts of an
author’s original manuscript. The same material can be searched
in seconds for occurrences of a particular term or internally
compared section for section so as to reveal recurrent phrases,
and so on.
The foundation of an electronic edition is invariably a
transcription of the source material interspersed with codes
which enable a computer to distinguish the numerous textual
features. The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen
uses a "mark-up" language (an encoding syntax plus a
vocabulary of code names) called MECS-WIT for the
transcription of Wittgenstein’s Nachlaß. This language was
specially developed to handle the features typical of an opus
which is largely handwritten and unfinished, such as frequent
deletions, later additions, rearrangement of material etc.
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The transcription of "Notes on Logic" from which the current
publication is derived was originally prepared byMichael Biggs.
It was then proof-read by Michael Biggs and Peter Cripps. The
transcription of item 201a-1 (McMaster’s catalogue no.s
RA1.710.057822 and RA1.710.057823) is presented here in two
formats: "normalised" and "diplomatic". Items 201a-2
(McMaster’s catalogue no. RA1.710.057824) and 201a-3 (referred
to in this publication as TSx), being essentially variants of 201a-1,
are presented in "diplomatic" format only.
The electronic version of this publication will be made available
on the Internet under the URL http://www.hd.uib.no/wab/
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"Normalised" Transcription of Item 201a-1
Legend
Bold Editorial comments and marks
Underlined Underlined with straight solid line
Doubly underlined Underlined with two straight solid
lines
Doubly underlined Underlined with three or more
and italicised straight solid lines
Italics Letterspaced
@ Unreadable text
<!> Editorial instruction or intertextual
reference - cf diplomatic version
Bold numbers (A1, A2,... B1, B2,...) in the left margin at the
beginning of sections (paragraphs) refer to page numbers in the
original, - cf diplomatic version. If the page shift occurs inside
a section, its position is marked .
Deleted, overwritten and substituted text has been left out,
orthographic errors tacitly corrected.
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Item 201a-1 (RA1.710.057822 and (RA1.710.057823)
A1 Summary
One reason for thinking the old notation wrong is that it is
very unlikely that from every proposition p an infinite number
of other propositions not-not-p, not-not-not-not-p, etc.,
should follow.
If only those signs which contain proper names were
complex then propositions containing nothing but apparent
variables would be simple. Then what about their denials?
The verb of a proposition cannot be „is true” or „is false”,
but whatever is true or false must already contain the verb.
Deductions only proceed according to the laws of
deduction, but these laws cannot justify the deduction.
One reason for supposing that not all propositions which
have more than one argument are relational propositions is that
if they were, the relations of judgement and inference would
have to hold between an arbitrary number of things.
Every proposition which seems to be about a complex can
be analysed into a proposition about its constituents and about
the proposition which describes the complex perfectly; i.e., that
proposition which is equivalent to saying the complex exists.
The idea that propositions are names of complexes suggests
that whatever is not a proper name is a sign for a relation.
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Because spatial complexes1 consist of Things and Relations only
and the idea of a complex is taken from space.
In a proposition convert all its indefinables into variables;
there then remains a class of propositions which is not all
propositions but a type.
A2 There are thus two ways in which signs are similar. The
names Socrates and Plato are similar: they are both names. But
whatever they have in common must not be introduced before
Socrates and Plato are introduced. The same applies to
subject-predicate form etc. Therefore, thing, proposition,
subject-predicate form, etc., are not indefinables, i.e., types are
not indefinables.
When we say A judges that etc., then we have to
mention a whole proposition which A judges. It will not do
either to mention only its constituents, or its constituents and
form, but not in the proper order. This shows that a proposition
itself must occur in the statement that it is judged; however, for
instance, „not-p” may be explained. The question „What is
negated” must have a meaning.
To understand a proposition p it is not enough to know
that p implies „p” is true , but we must also know that ~p
implies „p is false”. This shows the bipolarity of the proposition.
W-F = Wahr-Falsch
To every molecular function a WF scheme corresponds.
Therefore we may use the WF scheme itself instead of the
function. Now what the WF scheme does is, it correlates the
letters W and F with each proposition. These two letters are the
poles of atomic propositions. Then the scheme correlates another
W and F to these poles. In this notation all that matters is the
1 you for instance imagine every fact as a spatial complex.
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correlation of the outside poles to the pole of the atomic
propositions. Therefore not-not-p is the same symbol as p.
And therefore we shall never get two symbols for the same
molecular function.
A3 The meaning of a proposition is the fact which actually
corresponds to it.
As the ab functions of atomic propositions are bi-polar
propositions again we can perform ab operations on them. We
shall, by doing so, correlate two new outside poles via the old
outside poles to the poles of the atomic propositions.
The symbolising fact in a p b is that, say1 a is on the left
of p and b on the right of p; then the correlation of new poles
is to be transitive, so that for instance if a new pole a in
whatever way i.e. via whatever poles is correlated to the inside
a, the symbol is not changed thereby. It is therefore possible to
construct all possible ab functions by performing one ab
operation repeatedly, and we can therefore talk of all ab
functions as of all those functions which can be obtained by
performing this ab operation repeatedly.
[Note by Bertrand Russell]
[NB. ab means the same as WF, which means true-false.]
1 This is quite arbitrary but if we such have fixed on which
sides the poles have to stand we must of course stick to our
convention. If for instance „apb” says p then bpa says
nothing. (It does not say ~p.) But a apb b is the same
symbol as apb the ab function vanishes automatically for
here the new poles are related to the same side of p as the old
ones. The question is always: how are the new poles
correlated to p compared with the way the old poles are
correlated to p.
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Naming is like pointing. A function is like a line dividing
points of a plane into right and left ones; then „p or not-p” has
no meaning because it does not divide the plane.
But though a particular proposition „p or not-p” has no
meaning, a general proposition „for all p’s, p or not-p” has a
meaning because this does not contain the nonsensical function
„p or not-p” but the function „p or not-q” just as „for all x’s
xRx” contains the function „xRy”.
A4 A proposition is a standard to which all facts behave, with
names it is otherwise; it is thus bi-polarity and sense comes in;
just as one arrow behaves to another arrow by being in the
same sense or the opposite, so a fact behaves to a proposition.
The form of a proposition has meaning in the following
way. Consider a symbol „xRy”. To symbols of this form
correspond couples of things whose names are respectively „x”
and „y”. The things x y stand to one another in all sorts of
relations, amongst others some stand in the relation R, and some
not; just as I single out a particular thing by a particular name
I single out all behaviours of the points x and y with respect to
the relation R. I say that if an x stands in the relation R to a y
the sign „x R y” is to be called true to the fact and otherwise
false. This is a definition of sense.
In my theory p has the same meaning as not-p but
opposite sense. The meaning is the fact. The proper theory of
judgment must make it impossible to judge nonsense.
It is not strictly true to say that we understand a
proposition p if we know that p is equivalent to „p is true” for
this would be the case if accidentally both were true or false.
What is wanted is the formal equivalence with respect to the
forms of the proposition, i.e., all the general indefinables
involved. The sense of an ab function of a proposition is a
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function of its sense. There are only unasserted propositions.
Assertion is merely psychological. In not-p, p is exactly the
same as if it stands alone; this point is absolutely fundamental.
Among the facts which make „p or q” true there are also facts
which make „p and q” true; if propositions have only meaning,
we ought, in such a case, to say that these two propositions are
identical, but in fact, their sense is different for we have
introduced sense by talking of all p’s and all q’s.
Consequently the molecular propositions will only be used in
cases where there ab function stands under a generality sign or
enters into another function such as „I believe that, etc.,”
because then the sense enters.
A5 In „a judges p” p cannot be replaced by a proper name.
This appears if we substitute „a judges that p is true and not p
is false”. The proposition „a judges p” consists of the proper
name a, the proposition p with its 2 poles, and a being related
to both of these poles in a certain way. This is obviously not a
relation in the ordinary sense.
The ab notation makes it clear that not and or are
dependent on one another and we can therefore not use them
as simultaneous indefinables. <!> Same objections in the case of
apparent variables to old indefinables, as in the case of
molecular functions: The application of the ab notation to
apparent-variable propositions becomes clear if we consider that,
for instance, the proposition „for all x, ϕx” is to be true when
ϕx is true for all x’s and false when ϕx is false for some x’s.
We see that some and all occur simultaneously in the proper
apparent variable notation.
A6 The Notation is:
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for (x) ϕx ; a - (x) - a ϕ x b - (∃ x) - b
and
for (∃x) ϕ x : a - (∃x) - a ϕ x b - (x) - b
Old definitions now become tautologous.
In aRb it is not the complex that symbolises but the fact
that the symbol a stands in a certain relation to the symbol b.
Thus facts are symbolised by facts, or more correctly: that a
certain thing is the case in the symbol says that a certain thing
is the case in the world.
Judgment, question and command are all on the same level.
What interests logic in them is only the unasserted proposition.
Facts cannot be named.
A proposition cannot occur in itself. This is the fundamental
truth of the theory of types.
Every proposition that says something about one thing is a
subject-predicate proposition, and so on.
Therefore we can recognize a subject-predicate proposition
if we know it contains only one name and one form, etc. This
gives the construction of types. Hence the type of a proposition
can be recognized by its symbol alone.
A7 What is essential in a correct apparent-variable notation is
this: (1) it must mention a type of propositions; (2) it must
show which components of a proposition of this type are
constants.
[Components are forms and constituents.]
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Take (ϕ).ϕ!x. Then if we describe the kind of symbols, for
which ϕ! stands and which, by the above, is enough to
determine the type, then automatically „(ϕ).ϕ!x” cannot be
fitted by this description, because it contains „ϕ!x” and the
description is to describe all that symbolizes in symbols of the
ϕ! kind. If the description is thus complete vicious circles can
just as little occur as for instance in (ϕ).(x)ϕ (where (x)ϕ is a
subject-predicate proposition).
B1 First MS.
Indefinables are of two sorts: names, and forms. Propositions
cannot consist of names alone; they cannot be classes of names.
A name can not only occur in two different propositions, but
can occur in the same way in both.
Propositions [which are symbols having reference to facts]
are themselves facts: that this inkpot is on this table may express
that I sit in this chair.
It can never express the common characteristic of two
objects that we designate them by the same name but by two
different ways of designation, for, since names are arbitrary, we
might also choose different names, and where then would be
the common element in the designations? Nevertheless one is
always tempted, in a difficulty, to take refuge in different ways
of designation.
Frege said „propositions are names”; Russell said
„propositions correspond to complexes”. Both are false; and
especially false is the statement „propositions are names of
complexes”.
It is easy to suppose that only such symbols are complex as
contain names of objects, and that accordingly „(∃x,ϕ).ϕx” or
„(∃x,R,y).xRy” must be simple. It is then natural to call the
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first of these the name of a form, the second the name of a
relation. But in that case what is the meaning of (e.g.)
„~(∃x,y).xRy”? Can we put „not” before a name?
B2 The reasonwhy „~Socrates”means nothing is that „~x” does
not express a property of x.
There are positive and negative facts: if the proposition
„this rose is not red” is true, then what it signifies is negative.
But the occurrence of the word „not” does not indicate this
unless we know that the signification of the proposition „this
rose is red” (when it is true) is positive. It is only from both, the
negation and the negated proposition, that we can conclude to
a characteristic of the significance of the whole proposition. (We
are not here speaking of negations of general propositions, i.e.
of such as contain apparent variables. Negative facts only justify
the negations of atomic propositions.)
Positive and negative facts there are, but not true and false
facts.
If we overlook the fact that propositions have a sense which
is independent of their truth or falsehood, it easily seems as if
true and false were two equally justified relations between the
sign and what is signified. (We might then say e.g. that „q”
signifies in the true way what „not-q” signifies in the false
way). But are not true and false in fact equally justified? Could
we not express ourselves by means of false propositions just as
well as hitherto with true ones, so long as we know that they
are meant falsely? No! For a proposition is then true when it
is as we assert in this proposition; and accordingly if by „q” we
mean „not-q”, and it is as we mean to assert, then in the new
interpretation „q” is actually true and not false. But it is
important that we can mean the same by „q” as by „not-q”, for
it shows that neither to the symbol „not” nor to the manner of
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its combination with „q” does a characteristic of the denotation
of „q” correspond.
B4 2nd MS.
We must be able to understand propositions which we have
never heard before. But every proposition is a new symbol.
Hence we must have general indefinable symbols; these are
unavoidable if propositions are not all indefinable.
Whatever corresponds in reality to compound propositions
must not be more than what corresponds to their several atomic
propositions.
Not only must logic not deal with [particular] things, but
just as little with relations and predicates.
There are no propositions containing real variables.
What corresponds in reality to a proposition depends upon
whether it is true or false. But we must be able to understand a
proposition without knowing if it is true or false.
What we know when we understand a proposition is this:
We know what is the case if the proposition is true, and what
is the case if it is false. But we do not know [necessarily]
whether it is true or false.
Propositions are not names.
We can never distinguish one logical type from another by
attributing a property to members of the one which we deny to
members of the other.
Symbols are not what they seem to be. In „aRb”, „R” looks
like a substantive, but is not one. What symbolizes in „aRb” is
that R occurs between a and b. Hence „R” is not the indefinable
in „aRb”. Similarly in „ϕx”, „ϕ” looks like a substantive but is
not one; in „~p”, „~” looks like „ϕ” but is not like it. This is the
first thing that indicates that there may not be logical constants.
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A reason against them is the generality of logic: logic cannot
treat a special set of things.
B5 Molecular propositions contain nothing beyond what is
contained in their atoms; they add no material information
above that contained in their atoms.
All that is essential about molecular functions is their T-F
schema [i.e. the statement of the cases when they are true and
the cases when they are false].
Alternative indefinability shows that the indefinables have
not been reached.
Every proposition is essentially true-false: to understand it,
we must know both what must be the case if it is true, and
what must be the case if it is false. Thus a proposition has two
poles, corresponding to the case of its truth and the case of its
falsehood. We call this the sense of a proposition.
In regard to notation, it is important to note that not every
feature of a symbol symbolizes. In two molecular functions
which have the same T-F schema, what symbolizes must be the
same. In „not-not-p”, „not-p” does not occur; for
„not-not-p” is the same as ”p”, and therefore, if „not-p”
occurred in „not-not-p”, it would occur in „p”.
Logical indefinables cannot be predicates or relations,
because propositions, owing to sense, cannot have predicates or
relations. Nor are „not” and „or”, like judgment, analogous to
predicates or relations, because they do not introduce anything
new.
Propositions are always complex even if they contain no
names.
B6 A proposition must be understood when all its indefinables
are understood. The indefinables in „aRb” are introduced as
follows:
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„a” is indefinable;
„b” is indefinable;
Whatever „x” and „y” may mean, „xRy” says something
indefinable about their meanings.
A complex symbol must never be introduced as a single
indefinable. (Thus e.g. no proposition is indefinable.) For if one
of its parts occurs also in another connection, it must there be
re-introduced. And would it then mean the same?
The ways by which we introduce our indefinables must
permit us to construct all propositions that have sense from
these indefinables alone. It is easy to introduce „all” and „some”
in a way that will make the construction of (say) „(x,y).xRy”
possible from „all” and „xRy” as introduced before.
B7 3rd MS.
An analogy for the theory of truth: Consider a black patch on
white paper; then we can describe the form of the patch by
mentioning, for each point of the surface, whether it is white or
black. To the fact that a point is black corresponds a positive
fact, to the fact that a point is white (not black) corresponds a
negative fact. If I designate a point of the surface (one of Frege’s
„truth-values”), this is as if I set up an assumption to be decided
upon. But in order to be able to say of a point that it is black or
that it is white, I must first know when a point is to be called
black and when it is to be called white. In order to be able to
say that „p” is true (or false), I must first have determined
under what circumstances I call a proposition true, and thereby
I determine the sense of a proposition. The point in which the
analogy fails is this: I can indicate a point of the paper that is
white and black, but to a proposition without sense nothing
corresponds, for it does not designate a thing (truth-value),
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whose properties might be called „false” or „true”; the verb of
a proposition is not „is true” or „is false”, as Frege believes, but
what is true must already contain the verb.
The comparison of language and reality is like that of
retinal image and visual image: to the blind spot nothing in the
visual image seems to correspond, and thereby the boundaries
of the blind spot determine the visual image as true negations
of atomic propositions determine reality.
B8 Logical inferences can, it is true, be made in accordance
with Frege’s or Russell’s laws of deduction, but this cannot
justify the inference; and therefore they are not primitive
propositions of logic. If p follows from q, it can also be inferred
from q, and the „manner of deduction” is indifferent.
Those symbols which are called propositions in which
„variables occur” are in reality not propositions at all, but only
schemes of propositions, which only become propositions when
we replace the variables by constants. There is no proposition
which is expressed by „x = x”, for „x” has no signification; but
there is a proposition „(x).x = x” and propositions such as
„Socrates = Socrates” etc.
In books on logic, no variables ought to occur, but only the
general propositions which justify the use of variables. It follows
that the so-called definitions of logic are not definitions, but
only schemes of definitions, and instead of these we ought to
put general propositions; and similarly the so-called primitive
ideas (Urzeichen) of logic are not primitive ideas, but the
schemes of them. The mistaken idea that there are things called
facts or complexes and relations easily leads to the opinion that
there must be a relation of questioning to the facts, and then the
question arises whether a relation can hold between an arbitrary
number of things, since a fact can follow from arbitrary cases.
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It is a fact that the proposition which e.g. expresses that q
follows from p and p⊃q is this: p.p⊃q.⊃p.q.q.
B9 At a pinch, one is tempted to interpret „not-p” as
„everything else, only not p”. That from a single fact p an
infinity of others, not-not-p etc., follow, is hardly credible.
Man possesses an innate capacity for constructing symbols with
which some sense can be expressed, without having the slightest
idea what each word signifies. The best example of this is
mathematics, for man has until lately used the symbols for
numbers without knowing what they signify or that they signify
nothing.
Russell’s „complexes” were to have the useful property of
being compounded, and were to combine with this the agreeable
property that they could be treated like „simples”. But this alone
made them unserviceable as logical types, since there would
have been significance in asserting, of a simple, that it was
complex. But a property cannot be a logical type.
Every statement about apparent complexes can be resolved
into the logical sum of a statement about the constituents and a
statement about the proposition which describes the complex
completely. How, in each case, the resolution is to be made, is
an important question, but its answer is not unconditionally
necessary for the construction of logic.
B10 That „or” and „not” etc. are not relations in the same sense
as „right” and „left” etc., is obvious to the plain man. The
possibility of cross-definitions in the old logical indefinables
shows, of itself, that these are not the right indefinables, and,
even more conclusively, that they do not denote relations.
If we change a constituent a of a proposition ϕ(a) into a
variable, then there is a class
~
p {(∃x).ϕ(x) = p}.
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This class in general still depends upon what, by an arbitrary
convention, we mean by „ϕ(x)”. But if we change into variables
all those symbols whose significance was arbitrarily determined,
there is still such a class. But this is now not dependent upon
any convention, but only upon the nature of the symbol „ϕ(x)”.
It corresponds to a logical type.
Types can never be distinguished from each other by saying
(as is often done) that one has these but the other has that
properties, for this presupposes that there is a meaning in
asserting all these properties of both types. But from this it
follows that, at best, these properties may be types, but certainly
not the objects of which they are asserted.
B11 At a pinch, we are always inclined to explanations of logical
functions of propositions which aim at introducing into the
function either only the constituents of these propositions, or
only their forms, etc. etc.; and we overlook that ordinary
language would not contain the whole propositions if it did not
need them: However, e.g., „not-p” may be explained, there
must always be a meaning given to the question „what is
denied?”
The very possibility of Frege’s explanations of „not-p” and
„if p then q”, from which it follows that not-not-p
denotes the same as p, makes it probable that there is some
method of designation in which „not-not-p” corresponds to
the same symbol as „p”. But if this method of designation
suffices for logic, it must be the right one.
Names are points, propositions arrows they have sense.
The sense of a proposition is determined by the two poles true
and false. The form of a proposition is like a straight line, which
divides all points of a plane into right and left. The line does
this automatically, the form of proposition only by convention.
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B12 Just as little as we are concerned, in logic, with the relation
of a name to its meaning, just so little are we concerned with
the relation of a proposition to reality, but we want to know the
meaning of names and the sense of propositions as we
introduce an indefinable concept „A” by saying: „ A denotes
something indefinable”, so we introduce e.g. the form of
propositions aRb by saying: „For all meanings of „x” and „y”,
„xRy” expresses something indefinable about x and y”.
In place of every proposition „p”, let us write „abp”. Let
every correlation of propositions to each other or of names to
propositions be effected by a correlation of their poles „a” and
„b”. Let this correlation be transitive. Then accordingly „a-ab-bp”
is the same symbol as „abp”. Let n propositions be given. I then
call a „class of poles” of these propositions every class of n
members, of which each is a pole of one of the n propositions,
so that one member corresponds to each proposition. I then
correlate with each class of poles one of two poles (a and b). The
sense of the symbolizing fact thus constructed I cannot define,
but I know it.
If p = not-not-p etc., this shows that the traditional
method of symbolism is wrong, since it allows a plurality of
symbols with the same sense; and thence it follows that, in
analyzing such propositions, we must not be guided by Russell’s
method of symbolizing.
B13 It is to be remembered that names are not things, but
classes: „A” is the same letter as „A”. This has the most
important consequences for every symbolic language.
Neither the sense nor the meaning of a proposition is a
thing. These words are incomplete symbols.
It is impossible to dispense with propositions in which the
same argument occurs in different positions. It is obviously
useless to replace ϕ(a,a) by ϕ(a,b).a = b.
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Since the ab-functions of p are again bi-polar propositions,
we can form ab-functions of them, and so on. In this way a
series of propositions will arise, in which in general the
symbolizing facts will be the same in several members. If now
we find an ab-function of such a kind that by repeated
application of it every ab-function can be generated, then we can
introduce the totality of ab-functions as the totality of those that
are generated by application of this function. Such a function is
~p∨~q.
B14 It is easy to suppose a contradiction in the fact that on the
one hand every possible complex proposition is a simple
ab-function of simple propositions, and that on the other hand
the repeated application of one ab-function suffices to generate
all these propositions. If e.g. an affirmation can be generated by
double negation, is negation in any sense contained in
affirmation? Does „p” deny „not-p” or assert „p”, or both?
And how do matters stand with the definition of „⊃” by „∨”
and „ ”, or of „∨” by „ ” and „⊃”? And how e.g. shall we
introduce p|q (i.e. ~p∨~q), if not by saying that this expression
says something indefinable about all arguments p and q? But
the ab-functions must be introduced as follows: The function
p|q is merely a mechanical instrument for constructing all
possible symbols of ab-functions. The symbols arising by
repeated application of the symbol „|” do not contain the
symbol „p|q”. We need a rule according to which we can form
all symbols of ab-functions, in order to be able to speak of the
class of them; and we now speak of them e.g. as those symbols
of functions which can be generated by repeated application of
the operation „|”. And we say now: For all p’s and q’s, „p|q”
says something indefinable about the sense of those simple
propositions which are contained in p and q.
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B15 The assertion-sign is logically quite without significance. It
only shows, in Frege and Whitehead and Russell, that these
authors hold the propositions so indicated to be true. „ ”
therefore belongs as little to the proposition as (say) the number
of the proposition. A proposition cannot possibly assert of itself
that it is true.
Every right theory of judgment must make it impossible for
me to judge that this table penholders the book. Russell’s theory
does not satisfy this requirement.
It is clear that we understand propositions without knowing
whether they are true or false. But we can only know the
meaning of a proposition when we know if it is true or false.
What we understand is the sense of the proposition.
The assumption of the existence of logical objects makes it
appear remarkable that in the sciences propositions of the form
„p∨q”, „p⊃q”, etc. are only then not provisional when „∨” and
”⊃” stand within the scope of a generality-sign [apparent
variable].
B16 4th MS.
If we formed all possible atomic propositions, the world would
be completely described if we declared the truth or falsehood of
each. [I doubt this.]
The chief characteristic of my theory is that, in it, p has the
same meaning as not-p.
A false theory of relations makes it easily seem as if the
relation of fact and constituent were the same as that of fact and
fact which follows from it. But the similarity of the two may be
expressed thus: ϕa.⊃.ϕ,a a = a.
If a word creates a world so that in it the principles of logic
are true, it thereby creates a world in which the whole of
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mathematics holds; and similarly it could not create a world in
which a proposition was true, without creating its constituents.
Signs of the form „p∨~p” are senseless, but not the
proposition „(p).p ∨ ~p”. If I know that this rose is either red
or not red, I know nothing. The same holds of all ab-functions.
To understand a proposition means to know what is the
case if it is true. Hence we can understand it without knowing
if it is true. We understand it when we understand its
constituents and forms. If we know the meaning of „a” and „b”,
and if we know what „xRy” means for all x’s and y’s, then we
also understand „aRb”.
I understand the proposition „aRb” when I know that either
the fact that aRb or the fact that not aRb corresponds to it; but
this is not to be confused with the false opinion that I
understand „aRb” when I know that „aRb or not-aRb” is the
case.
B17 But the form of a proposition symbolizes in the following
way: Let us consider symbols of the form „xRy”; to these
correspond primarily pairs of objects, of which one has the
name „x”, the other the name „y”. The x’s and y’s stand in
various relations to each other, among others the relation R
holds between some, but not between others. I now determine
the sense of „xRy” by laying down: when the facts behave in
regard to „xRy” so that the meaning of „x” stands in the
relation R to the meaning of „y”, then I say that they [the facts]
are „of like sense” [„gleichsinnig”] with the proposition „xRy”;
otherwise, „of opposite sense” [„entgegengesetzt”]; I correlate
the facts to the symbol „xRy” by thus dividing them into those
of like sense and those of opposite sense. To this correlation
corresponds the correlation of name and meaning. Both are
psychological. Thus I understand the form „xRy” when I know
that it discriminates the behaviour of x and y according as these
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stand in the relation R or not. In this way I extract from all
possible relations the relation R, as, by a name, I extract its
meaning from among all possible things.
Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to say: We understand the
proposition p when we know that „p” is true ≡ p; for this
would naturally always be the case if accidentally the
propositions to right and left of the symbol „≡” were both true
or both false. We require not only an equivalence, but a formal
equivalence, which is bound up with the introduction of the
form of p.
The sense of an ab-function of p is a function of the sense
of p.
B18 The ab-functions use the discrimination of facts, which their
arguments bring forth, in order to generate new discriminations.
Only facts can express sense, a class of names cannot. This
is easily shown.
There is no thing which is the form of a proposition, and no
name which is the name of a form. Accordingly we can also not
say that a relation which in certain cases holds between things
holds sometimes between forms and things. This goes against
Russell’s theory of judgment.
It is very easy to forget that, tho. the propositions of a form
can be either true or false, each one of these propositions can
only be either true or false, not both.
Among the facts which make „p or q” true, there are some
which make „p and q” true; but the class which makes „p or q”
true is different from the class which makes „p and q” true; and
only this is what matters. For we introduce this class, as it were,
when we introduce ab-functions.
A very natural objection to the way in which I have
introduced e.g. propositions of the form xRy is that by it
propositions such as (∃x,y).xRy and similar ones are not
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explained, which yet obviously have in common with aRb what
cRd has in common with aRb. But when we introduced
propositions of the form xRy we mentioned no one particular
proposition of this form; and we only need to introduce
(∃x,y).ϕ(x,y) for all ϕ’s in any way which makes the sense
of these propositions dependent on the sense of all propositions
of the form ϕ(a,b), and thereby the justification of our
procedure is proved.
B19 The indefinables of logic must be independent of each
other. If an indefinable is introduced, it must be introduced in
all combinations in which it can occur. We cannot therefore
introduce it first for one combination, then for another; e.g., if
the form xRy has been introduced, it must henceforth be
understood in propositions of the form aRb just in the same
way as in propositions such as (∃x,y). xRy and others. We
must not introduce it first for one class of cases, then for the
other; for it would remain doubtful if its meaning was the same
in both cases, and there would be no ground for using the same
manner of combining symbols in both cases. In short, for the
introduction of indefinable symbols and combinations of
symbols the same holds, mutatis mutandis, that Frege has said
for the introduction of symbols by definitions.
It is a priori likely that the introduction of atomic
propositions is fundamental for the understanding of all other
kinds of propositions. In fact the understanding of general
propositions obviously depends on that of atomic propositions.
Cross-definability in the realm of general propositions leads
to the quite similar questions to those in the realm of
ab-functions.
B20 When we say „A believes p”, this sounds, it is true, as if
here we could substitute a proper name for „p”; but we can see
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that here a sense, not a meaning, is concerned, if we say „A
believes that p is true”; and in order to make the direction of
p even more explicit, we might say „A believes that p is true
and not-p is false”. Here the bi-polarity of p is expressed,
and it seems that we shall only be able to express the
proposition „A believes p” correctly by the ab-notation; say by
making „A” have a relation to the poles „a” and „b” of a-p-b.
The epistemological questions concerning the nature of
judgment and belief cannot be solved without a correct
apprehension of the form of the proposition.
The ab-notation shows the dependence of or and not, and
thereby that they are not to be employed as simultaneous
indefinables.
Not: „The complex sign aRb ” says that a stands in the
relation R to b; but that a stands in a certain relation to b
says that aRb.
In philosophy there are no deductions: it is purely
descriptive.
Philosophy gives no pictures of reality.
Philosophy can neither confirm nor confute scientific
investigation.
B21 Philosophy consists of logic and metaphysics: logic is its
basis.
Epistemology is the philosophy of psychology.
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Distrust of grammar is the first requisite for philosophizing.
Propositions can never be indefinables, for they are always
complex. That also words like „ambulo” are complex appears in
the fact that their root with a different termination gives a
different sense.
Only the doctrine of general indefinables permits us to
understand the nature of functions. Neglect of this doctrine
leads to an impenetrable thicket.
Philosophy is the doctrine of the logical form of scientific
propositions (not only of primitive propositions).
The word „philosophy” ought always to designate
something over or under, but not beside, the natural sciences.
Judgment, command and question all stand on the same
level; but all have in common the propositional form, which
does interests us.
The structure of the proposition must be recognized, the
rest comes of itself. But ordinary language conceals the structure
of the proposition: in it, relations look like predicates, predicates
like names, etc.
Facts cannot be named.
B22 It is easy to suppose that „individual”, „particular”,
„complex” etc. are primitive ideas of logic. Russell e.g. says
„individual” and „matrix” are „primitive ideas”. This error
presumably is to be explained by the fact that, by employment
of variables instead of the generality-sign, it comes to seem as
if logic dealt with things which have been deprived of all
properties except thing-hood, and with propositions deprived of
all properties except complexity. We forget that the indefinables
of symbols [Urbilder von Zeichen] only occur under the
generality-sign, never outside it.
Just as people used to struggle to bring all propositions into
the subject-predicate form, so now it is natural to conceive every
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proposition as expressing a relation, which is just as incorrect.
What is justified in this desire is fully satisfied by Russell’s
theory of manufactured relations.
One of the most natural attempts at solution consists in
regarding „not-p” as „the opposite of p”, where then
„opposite” would be the indefinable relation. But it is easy to
see that every such attempt to replace the ab-functions by
descriptions must fail.
B23 The false assumption that propositions are names leads us
to believe that there must be logical objects: for the meanings of
logical propositions will have to be such things.
A correct explanation of logical propositions must give
them a unique position as against all other propositions.
No proposition can say anything about itself, because the
symbol of the proposition cannot be contained in itself; this
must be the basis of the theory of logical types.
Every proposition which says something indefinable about
a thing is a subject-predicate proposition; every proposition
which says something indefinable about two things expresses a
dual relation between these things, and so on. Thus every
proposition which contains only one name and one indefinable
form is a subject-predicate proposition, and so on. An
indefinable simple symbol can only be a name, and therefore we
can know, by the symbol of an atomic proposition, whether it
is a subject-predicate proposition.
B24 I. Bi-polarity of propositions: sense and meaning, truth and
falsehood.
II. Analysis of atomic propositions: general indefinables,
predicates, etc.
III. Analysis of molecular propositions: ab-functions.
IV. Analysis of general propositions.
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V. Principles of symbolism: what symbolizes in a symbol. Facts
for facts.
VI. Types.
B25
This is the symbol for
~p ∨ ~q
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1
‹Summary›1
The2 One1 reason for thinking the old
notation wrong is that it is very unlikely that
from every proposition p an infinite number of
other propositions not-not-p, not-not-not-not-p,
etc., should follow.
If only th[e|o3]se signs which contain proper
names were complex then propositions containing
nothing but apparent variables would be simple.
Then what about their denials?
The verb of a proposition cannot be ”is true”
or ”is false”, but whatever is true or false must
already contain the verb.
The2 [d|D3]eductions only proceed according
to the laws of deduction‹,›4 but these laws cannot
justify the deduction.
The2 One1 reason for supposing that not all
propositions which have more than one argument are
relational propositions is that if 1 they
were‹,›1 the relations of judgement and inference
that2 would1 have to hold between an arbitrary
number of things.
Every proposition which seems to be about a
complex can be analysed into a proposition about
those2 its 1 cons[i|t]ituents and about the
proposition which describes a2 the1 complex
perfectly; i.e., that proposition which is
equivalent to saying a2 the1 complex exists.
The idea that propositions are names of
complexes between5 L.W.
4 suggestions5‹s›4 〈? 〉 6
L.W.
4 that whatever is not a proper name is a sign
for a relation. ‹Because spatial complexes*
consist of Things & Relations only & the idea of a
complex is taken from sp›4
In a proposition convert all its indefinables
into variables; there then remains a class of
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propositions which has2 is1 not all propositions
but a type.
〈* you7 - for instance imagine every fact as a
spatial complex 〉 8
38
Item 201a-1 Recto Page A2
2
There are thus two ways in which signs are
similar. The names Socrates and Plato are similar:
they are both names. But whatever they have in
common must not be introduced before Socrates and
Plato are introduced. The same applies to
subject-predicate form etc. Therefore, thing,
proposition, subject-predicate form, etc., are not
indefinables, i.e., types are not indefinables.
When we say a2 A1 judge‹s›1 is2 that etc.,
then we have to mention a whole proposition which
a2 A1 judge‹s›1 is2. It will not do either to
mention only its constituent‹s,›1 or its
constituent‹s›1 and form, but not in the proper
order. This shows that a proposition itself must
occur in the statement that it is judged; however,
for instance, ”not-p” may be explained[.|,9] ‹p10
must occur in it.›1 5 〈[t|T9]he question, „What is
negated” must have a meaning 〉 11
Always a que[x|s]tion that is negated must
have a meaning.5 〈Rott! 〉 12
To understand a proposition p it is not
enough to know that ”5p implies ‹’”›4p” is
true‹’›4, but we must also know that p also
implies ‹’›4”not-p” is false‹’›4 5 ~p implies ”p
is false”4
. This shows the bi 13polarity of the
proposition.
〈W-F = Wahr-Falsch 〉 6
To every molecular function a 1 [wf|WF3]
scheme corresponds. Therefore we may use the
[wf|WF3] scheme itself instead of the function.
Now what the [wf|WF3] scheme does is, it
correlates the letters [w|W3] and [f|F3] with each
proposition. These two letters are the poles of
atomic propositions. Then the scheme 1
corresponds2lates1 another [f|W3] and [w|F3] to
these poles. In this notation all that it2 matters
is the correlation of the outside poles to the
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pole of its2 the 1 atomic propositions. Therefore
not-not-p is the same symbol as p. ‹And›1
Therefore we shall never get two symbols for the
same molecular functions5.
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The meaning of a proposition is the fact
which actually corresponds to it.
As the ab functions of atomic propositions
are by2i1‹-›1polar propositions again we can
perform ab7 operations on them. We [wi|sha9]ll‹,›4
b[e|y9] doing so, correlate two new outside poles
via the old outside poles to the poles of the
atomic propositions.
The symbolising fact in a-p-b is that, say7*
a7 is on the left of p7 and b7 on the right of
p7[,|;9] then the correlation of new poles is to
be transitive, such2 so1 that for instance 4 if a
new pole a7 in whatever way i.e. via whatever
poles 4 is correlated to the inside a7, the symbol
is not changed thereby. It is therefore possible
to construct all possible ab7 functions by
performing one ab7 operation repeatedly, and we
can therefore talk of all ab7 functions as of all
th[e|o9]se functions which can be obtained by
performing this ab7 operation repeatedly.
〈[Note by B.R.] 〉 6
[NB. ab7 means the same as [wf|WF3], which
means true-false.]
Naming is like pointing. A function is like a
line dividing points of a plane 4 into right and
left ones; then ‹”›1p or not-p‹”›1 has no meaning
because it does not divide [a|the9] plane.
But though a particular proposition ”p”5 or a
”
5not-p” has no meaning‹,›4 a general proposition
‹”›
4for all p’s, ”5p”5 or ”5not-p” has a meaning
because this does not contain [a|the9] nonsensical
function ‹”›4p [n|o]r not-p‹”›4 but [a|the9]
function ‹”›4p or ”5not-q” just as ‹”›4for all
”
5x’s xRx‹”›1 contains the function ‹”›4xRy”.
〈* This is quite arbitrary but if we such have
fixed on which sides the poles have to stand we
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must of course stick to our convention. If for
instance „apb” says p then bpa says nothing7. (It
does not say ~p) But a-apb-b is the same symbol as
apb 〉 8
〈the ab function vanishes automatically) for here
the new poles are 〉 14 〈related to the same side of
p as the old ones. The question is allways: how
are the new poles correlated to p compared with
the way the old poles are correlated to p. 〉 15
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A proposition is a standard to which all
facts behave, that2 with1 names it is 1
otherwise; it is then2us1 by2i1‹-›1polarity and
sense comes in‹;›1 just as one error2 arrow1
behaves to another error2 arrow1 by being in the
same sense or the opposite, so a fact behaves to a
proposition.
The form of a proposition has meaning in the
following way. Consider a symbol ‹”›4xRy‹”›4. To
symbols of this form correspond couples of things
whose names are respectively ‹”›4x‹”›4 and
‹”›
4y‹”›4. The things x7‹/›4y7 stand to one
another in all sorts of relations‹,›4 amongst
others some stand in the relatio[j|n] of2 R1, and
some not; just as I single out a particular thing
by a particular name I single out all behaviours
of the point‹s›1 x and y the one between2 with
respect to1 the relation ‹R.›1 of the other2. I
say that if an x stands in the relation of2 R1 to
a y the sign ‹”›4x of2 R1 y‹”›4 is to be called
true to the fact and otherwise false. This is a
definition of sense.
〈! 〉 16
In my theory p has the same meaning as not-p
but opposite snese. The meaning is the fact. The
proper theory of judgment must make it impossible
to judge nonsense.
It is not strictly true to say that we
understand a proposition p if we know that p is
equivalent to ”p is true” for this would be the
case if accidentally both were true or false. What
is wanted is the formal equivalence with respect
to the forms of the proposition[.|,9] i.e.,
[A|a9]ll the general indefinables involved. The
sense of an ab7 function of a proposition is a
function of its sense[:|.9] [t|T9]here are only
unasserted propositio‹ns.›4
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Assertion is merely psychological. If2n1 not-p‹,›1
p10 1 is exactly the same as if it stands
alone‹;›1 this point is absolutely fundamental.
Among the facts which make ”p or q” true1 there
are also facts which make ”p and q” true‹;›1 if
propositions do only mean2 have only
meaning 1‹,›1 we ought‹,›1 to know2 in 1 such a
case, to1 say that these two propositions are
identical, but in fact, their sense is different
for we have introduced sense by talking of all p’s
and all q’s. Consequently the molecular
propositions will only be used in cases where
there ab7 function stands under a generality sign
or enters into another function such as ‹”›4I
believe that, etc.,‹”›4 because then4 the sense
enters.
In ”a judges p” p cannot be replaced by a
proper name. This appears if we substitute ”a
judges that p is true and not p is false”. The
proposition ”a judges p” consists of the proper
name a[.|,9] [T|t9]he proposition p with its 2
poles‹,›4 and a7 being related to both of these
poles in a certain way. This is obviously not the5
‹a›4 relation in the ordinary sense.
The ab notation and5 for4 apparent variables5
make‹s›4 it clear that not and or are dependent on
one another and we can therefore not use them as
simultaneous indefinables. ‹|17›4 Some5 ‹Same›4
objections in the case of app. var. 4 to old
indefinables, [a|A9]s5 as4 18 in the case of
molecular functions19[,|:9] [t|T9]he application
of the ab notation to apparently5‹-›4 variable
propositions become‹s›4 clear if we consider that,
for instance, the proposition ‹”›4for all ”5x‹,›4
ϕx” is to be true when ϕx is true for all x’s and
false when ϕx is false for some x’s. We see that
some and all occur simultaneously in the proper
apparent variable notation.
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The Notation is:
for (x) ϕx ; a - (x) - a ϕ x b - (∃ x) - b
and
for (ϕ5∃x) ϕ x : a - (∃x) - a ϕ x b - (x) - [v|b]
Old definitions now become tautologous.
In aRb it is not the complex that symbolises
but the fact that the symbol a stands in a certain
relation to the symbol b. Thus facts are
symbolised by facts, or the5 more correctly: that
a certain thing is the case in the symbol says
that a certain thing is the case in the world.
Judgment, question and command are all on the
same level. What interests logic in them is only
the unasserted proposition. Facts cannot be named.
A proposition cannot occur in itself. This is
the fundamental truth of the theory of types.
Every proposition that says something
important5 about one thing is a subject-predicate
proposition, and so on.
Therefore we can recognize a
subject-predicate proposition if we know it
contains only one name and one form, etc. This
gives the construction of types. Hence the type of
a proposition can be recognized by its symbol
alone.
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What is essential in a correct
apparent -variable 1 notation is this:- (1) it
must mention a type of propositions; (2) it must
show which components of a proposition of this
type are constants.@
[Components are forms and constituents.]
Take (ϕ).ϕ!x. Then if we describe the kind7
of symbols20 , for which ϕ! stands 4 ‹&›4 which,
by the above, is enough to determine the type,
then automatically ”([x|ϕ]).ϕ!x” cannot be
fi[ll|tt]ed by this descri[l|p]tion[.|,9] ‹because
it contains7 „ϕ!x” & the description is to
describe all7 that symbolizes in symbols of the ϕ!
- kind. If the description is thus7 complete
vicious circles can just as little occur as if5
for instance in (ϕ).ϕ(x)5 (ϕ).(x)ϕ4 (where (x)ϕ is
a subject-predicat prop) ›4
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Wittgenstein 1
First MS.
Indefinables are of two sorts: names, & forms.
Propositions cannot consist of names alone; they
cannot be classes of names. A name can not only
occur in two different propositions, but can
occur in the same way in both.
Propositions [which are symbols having
reference to facts] are themselves facts: that
this inkpot is on this table may express that I
sit in this chair.
It can never express the common
characteristic @ of two objects that we denote
designate them by the same name but by two
different ways of designation, for, since names
are arbitrary, we might ‹also› choose different
names, & where then would be the common element
in the designations? Nevertheless one is always
tempted, in a difficulty, to take refuge in
different ways of designation. @
Frege said ”propositions are names”;
Russell said ”propositions correspond to
complexes”. Both are false; & especially false
is the statement ”propositions are names of
complexes”.
It is easy to suppose that only such
symbols are complex as contain names of objects
objects, & that accordingly ”(∃x,ϕ).ϕx” or
”(∃x, R, y).xRy” must be simple. It is then
natural to call the first of these the name of a
form, the second the name of a relation. But in
that case what is the meaning of (e.g.)
”~(∃x,y).xRy”? Can we put ”not” before a name?
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The reason why ”~Socrates” means nothing is
that ”~x” does not express a property of x.
There are positive & negative facts: if the
proposition ”this rose is not red” is true, then
its what it signifies is negative. But the
occurrence of the word ”not” does not indicate
this unless we know that the signification of
the proposition
”this rose is red” (when it is
true) is positive. It is only from both, the
negation & the negated proposition, that we can
conclude to a characteristic of the significance
of the whole proposition. (We are not here
speaking of negations of general propositions,
i.e. of such as contain apparent variables.)
Negative facts only justify the negations of
simpl atomic propositions.)
Positive & negative facts there are, but
not true & false facts.
If we overlook the fact that propositions
have a sense which is independent of their truth
or falsehood, it easily seems as if true & false
were two equally justified relations between the
sign & what is signified. (We might then say
e.g. that ”q” signifies in the true way what
”not-q” signifies in the false way). But are not
true & false in fact equally justified? Could we
not express ourselves by means of false
propositions just as well as hitherto with true
ones, so long as we know that they are meant
falsely?
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No! For a proposition is then true when it is as
we assert in this proposition; & accordingly if
by ”q” we mean ”not-q”, & it is as we mean to
assert, then in the new interpretation ”q” is
actually true & not false. But it is important
that we can mean the same by ”q” as by ”not-q”,
for it shows that neither to the symbol ”not”
nor to the manner of its combination with ”q”
does a characteristic of the denotation of ”q”
correspond.
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2nd MS.
We must be able to understand propositions which
we have never heard before. But every
proposition is a new symbol. Hence we must have
general indefinable symbols; these are
unavoidable if propositions are not all
indefinable.
Whatever corresponds in reality to compound
propositions must not be more than what
corresponds to their several atomic
propositions.
Not only must logic not deal with
[particular] things, but just as little with
relations & predicates.
There are no propositions containing real
variables.
What corresponds in reality to a
proposition depends upon whether it is true or
false. But we must be able to understand a
proposition without knowing if it is true or
false.
What we know when we understand a
proposition is this: We know what is the case if
the proposition is true, & what is the case if
it is false. But we do not know [necessarily]
whether it is true or false.
Propositions are not names.
We can never distinguish one logical type
from another by attributing a property to
members of the one which we deny to members of
the other.
Symbols are not what they seem to be. In
”aRb”, ”R” looks like a substantive, but is not
one. What symbolizes in ”aRb” is that R occurs
between a & b. Hence ”R” is not the indefinable
in ”aRb”. Similarly in ”ϕx”, ”ϕ” looks like a
substantive but is not one; in ”~p”, ”~” looks
like ”ϕ” but is not like it. This is the first
50
thing that indicates that there may not be
logical constants. A reason against them is the
generality of logic: logic cannot treat a
special set of things.
51
Item 201a-1 Recto Page B5
Wittg.- 5
Molecular propositions contain nothing
beyond what is contained in their atoms; they
add no material information above that contained
in their atoms.
All that is essential about molecular
functions is their T-F schema [i.e. the
statement of the cases when they are true & the
cases when they are false].
Alternative indefinability shows that the
indefinables have not been reached.
Every proposition is essentially
true-false: to understand it, we must know both
what must be the case if it is true, & what must
be the case if it is false. Thus a proposition
has two poles, corresponding to the case of its
truth & the case of its falsehood. We call this
the sense of a proposition.
In regard to notation, it is important to
note that not every feature of a symbol
symbolizes. In two molecular functions which
have the same T-F schema, what symbolizes must
be the same. In ”not-not-p”, ”not-p” does not
occur; for ”not-not-p” is the same as ”p”, &
therefore, if ”not-p” occurred in ”not-not-p”,
it would occur in ”p”.
Logical indefinables cannot be predicates
or relations, because propositions, owing to
sense, cannot have predicates or relations. Nor
are ”not” & ”or”, like judgment, analogous to
predicates or relations, because they do not
introduce anything new.
Propositions are always complex even if
they contain no names.
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A proposition must be understood when all
its indefinables are understood. The
indefinables in ”aRb” are introduced as follows:
”a” is indefinable;
”b” is indefinable;
Whatever ”x” & ”y” may mean, ”xRy” says
something indefinable21 about their meanings.
A complex symbol must never be introduced
as a single indefinable. (Thus e.g. no
proposition is indefinable.) For if one of its
parts occurs also in another connection, it must
there be re-introduced. And would it then mean
the same?
The ways by which we introduce our
indefinables must permit us to construct all
propositions that have sense [? meaning] from
these indefinables alone. It is easy to
introduce ”all” & ”some” in a way that will make
the construction of (say) ”(x,y).xRy” possible
from ”all” & ”xRy” as introduced before.
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3rd MS.
A comparis An analogy for the theory of truth:
Consider a black patch on white paper; then we
can describe the form of the patch by
mentioning, for each point of the surface,
whether it is white or black. To the fact that a
point is black corresponds a positive fact, to
the fact that a point is white (not black)
corresponds a negative fact. If I designate a
point of the surface (one of Frege’s
”truth-values”), this is as if I set up an
assumption to be decided upon. But in order to
be able to say of a point that it is black or
that it is white, I must first know when a point
is to be called black & when it is to be called
white. In order to be able to say that ”p” is
true (or false), I must first have determined
under what circumstances I call a proposition
true, & thereby I determine the sense of a
proposition. The point [on|in] which the analogy
depends fails is this: I can indicate a point of
the paper what is white & black, but to a
proposition without sense nothing corresponds,
for it does not designate a thing (truth-value),
whose properties might be called ”false” or
”true”; the verb of a proposition is not ”is
true” or ”is false”, as Frege believes, but what
is true must already contain the verb.
The comparison of language & reality is
like that of retinal image & visual image: to
the blind spot nothing in the visual image seems
to correspond, & thereby the boundaries of the
blind spot determine the visual image - as true
negations of atomic propositions determine
reality.
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Logical inferences can, it is true, be made
in accordance with Frege’s or Russell’s laws of
deduction, but this cannot justify the
inference; & therefore they are not primitive
propositions of logic. If p follows from q, it
can also be inferred from q, & the ”manner of
deduction” is indifferent.
Those symbols which are called propositions
in which ”variables occur” are in reality not
propositions at all, but only schemes of
propositions, which only become propositions
when we replace the variables by constants.
There is no proposition which is expressed by ”x
= x”, for ”x” has no signification; but there is
a proposition ”(x).x = x” & propositions such as
”Socrates = Socrates” etc.
In books on logic, no variables ought to
occur, but only the general propositions which
justify the use of variables. It follows that
the so-called definitions of logic are not
definitions, but only schemes of definitions, &
instead of these we ought to put general
propositions; & similarly the so-called
primitive ideas (Urzeichen) of logic are not
primitive ideas, but the schemes of them. The
mistaken idea that there are things called facts
or complexes & relations easily leads to the
opinion that there must be a relation of
questioning to the facts, & then the question
arises whether a relation can hold between an
arbitrary number of things, since a fact can
follow from arbitrary cases. It is a fact that
the proposition which e.g. expresses that q
follows from p & p⊃q is this: p.p⊃q.⊃p.q.q.
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At a pinch, one is tempted to interpret
”not-p” as ”everything else, only not p”. That
from a single fact p an infinity of others,
not-not-p etc., follow, is hardly credible. Man
possesses an innate capacity for constructing
symbols with which some sense can be expressed,
without having the slightest idea what each word
signifies. The best example of this is
mathematics, for man has until lately used the
symbols for numbers without knowing what they
signify or that they signify nothing.
Russell’s ”complexes” were to have the
useful property of being compounded, & were to
combine with this the agreeable property that
they could be treated as like ”simples”. But
this alone made them unserviceable as logical
types, since there would have been significance
in asserting, of a simple, that it was complex.
But a property cannot be a logical type.
Every statement about apparent complexes
can be resolved into the logical sum of a
statement about the constituents & a statement
about the proposition which describes the
complex completely. How, in each case, the
resolution is to be made, is an important
question, but its answer is not unconditionally
necessary for the construction of logic.
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That ”or” & ”not” etc. are not relations in
the same sense as ”right” & ”left” etc., is
obvious to the plain man. The possibility of
cross-definitions in the old logical
indefinables shows, of itself, that these are
not the right indefinables, &, even more
conclusively, that they do not denote relations.
If we change a constituent a of a
proposition ϕ(a) into a variable, then there is
a class
~
p {(∃x).ϕ(x) = p}.
This class in general still depends upon what,
by an arbitrary convention, we have mean by
”ϕ(x)”. But if we change into variables all
those symbols whose significance was arbitrarily
determined, there is still such a class. But
this is now not dependent upon any convention,
but only upon the nature of the symbol ”ϕ(x)”.
It corresponds to a logical type.
Types can never be distinguished from each
other by saying (as is often done) that one has
th[i|e]s‹e› @ but the other has th[at|ose]
propert[y|i]‹es›, for this presupposes that
there is a meaning in asserting all these
properties of both types. But from this it
follows that, at best, these properties may be
types, but certainly not the objects of which
they are asserted.
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At a pinch, we are always inclined to
explanations of logical functions of
propositions which aim at introducing into the
function either only contain the constituents
of these propositions, or only their forms, etc.
etc; & we overlook that ordinary language would
not contain the whole propositions if it did not
need them: However, e.g., ”not-p” may be
explained, there must always be a meaning given
to the question ”what is denied?”
The very possibility of Frege’s
explanations of ”not-p” & ”if p then q”, from
which it follows that ”not-not-p” denotes the
same as p, makes it probable that there is some
method of designation in which ”not-not-p”
corresponds to the same symbol as ”p”. But if
this method of designation suffices for logic,
it must be the right one.
Names are points, sentences propositions
arrows - they have sense. The sense of a
proposition is determined by the two poles true
& false. The form of a proposition is like a
straight line, which divides all points of a
plane into right & left. The line does this
automatically, the form of proposition only by
convention.
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Just as little as we are concerned, in
logic, with the relation of a name to its
meaning, just so little are we concerned with
the relation of a proposition to reality, but we
want to know the meaning of names & the sense of
propositions - as we introduce an indefinable
concept ”A” by saying: ”’A’ denotes something
indefinable”, so we introduce e.g. the form of
propositions aRb by saying: ”For all meanings of
”x” & ”y”, ”xRy” expresses something indefinable
about x & y”.
In place of every proposition ”p”, let us
write @ ”abp”. Let every correlation of
propositions to each other or of names to
propositions be effected by a correlation of
their poles ”a” & ”b”. Let this correlation be
transitive. Then accordingly ”a-ab-bp” is the
same symbol as ”abp”. Let n propositions be
given. I then call a ”class of poles” of these
propositions every class of n members, of which
each is a pole of one of the n propositions, so
that one member corresponds to each proposition.
I then correlate with each class of poles one of
two poles (a & b). The sense of the symbolizing
fact thus constructed I cannot define, but I
know it.
If p = not-not-p etc., this shows that the
traditional method of symbolism is wrong, since
it allows a plurality of symbols with the same
sense; & thence it follows that, in analyzing
such propositions, we must not be guided by
Russell’s method of symbolizing.
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It is to be remembered that names are not
things, but classes: ”A” is the same letter as
”A”. This has the most important consequences
for every symbolic language.
Neither the sense nor the meaning of a
proposition is a thing. These words are
incomplete symbols.
It is impossible to dispense with
propositions in which the same argument occurs
in different positions. It is obviously useless
to replace ϕ(a,a) by ϕ(a,b).a = b.
Since the ab-functions of p are again
bi-polar propositions, we can form ab-functions
of them, & so on. In this way a series of
propositions will arise, in which in general the
symbolizing facts will be the same in several
members. If now we find an ab-function of such a
kind that by repeated application of it every
ab-function can be generated, then we can define
introduce the totality of ab-functions as the
totality of those that are generated by
application of this function. Such a function is
~p∨~q.
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It is easy to suppose a contradiction in
the fact that on the one hand all every possible
complex proposition is a simple ab-function of
simple propositions, & that on the other hand
the repeated application of one ab-function
suffices to generate all these propositions. If
e.g. an affirmation can be generated by double
negation, is negation in any sense contained in
affirmation? Does ”p” deny ”not-p” or assert
”p”, or both? And how do matters stand with the
definition of ”⊃” by ”∨” & ”~” ”.”, or of ”∨” by
”.” & ”⊃”? And how e.g. shall we introduce p|q
(i.e. ~p∨~q), if not by saying that this
expression says something indefinable about all
arguments p & q? But the ab-functions must be
introduced as follows: The function p|q is
merely a mechanical instrument for constructing
all possible symbols of ab-functions. The
symbols arising by repeated application of the
symbol ”|” do not contain the symbol ”p|q”. We
need a rule according to which we can form all
symbols of ab-functions, in order to be able to
speak of the class of them; & we now speak of
them e.g. as those symbols of functions which
can be generated by repeated application of the
operation ”|”. And we say now: For all p’s &
q’s, ”p|q” says something indefinable about the
sense of those simple propositions which are
contained in p & q.
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The assertion-sign is logically quite
without significance. It only shows, in Frege
& Whitehead & Russell, that these authors hold
the propositions so indicated to be true. ” ”
therefore belongs as little to the proposition
as (say) the number of the proposition. A
proposition cannot possibly assert of itself
that it is true.
Every right theory of judgment must make it
impossible for me to judge that this table
penholders the book. Russell’s theory does not
satisfy this requirement.
It is clear that we understand propositions
without knowing whether they are true or false.
But we can only know the meaning of a
proposition when we know if it is true or false.
What we understand is the sense of the
proposition.
The assumption of the existence of logical
objects makes it appear remarkable that in the
sciences propositions of the form ”p[or|∨]q”,
”p⊃q”, etc. are only then not provisional when
”∨” & ”⊃” stand within the scope of a
generality-sign [apparent variable].
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4th MS.
If we formed all possible atomic propositions,
the world would be completely described if we
declared the truth or falsehood of each. [I
doubt this.]
The chief characteristic of my theory is
that, in it, p has the same meaning as not-p.
A false theory of relations makes it easily
seem as if the relation of fact & constituent
were the same as that of fact & fact which
follows from it. But the similarity of the two
may be expressed thus: ϕa.⊃.ϕ,a a = a.
If a word creates a world so that in it the
principles of logic are true, it thereby creates
a world in which the whole of mathematics holds;
& similarly it could not create a world in which
a proposition was true, without creating its
constituents.
Signs of the form ”p∨~p” are senseless, but
not the proposition ”(p).p ∨ ~p”. If I know that
this rose is either red or not red, I know
nothing. The same holds of all ab-functions.
To understand a proposition means to know
what is the case if it is true. Hence we can
understand it without knowing if it is true. We
understand it when we understand its
constituents & forms. If we know the meaning of
”a” & ”b”, & if we know what ”xRy” means for all
x’s & y’s, then we also understand ”aRb”.
I understand the proposition ”aRb” when I
know that either the fact that aRb or the fact
that not aRb corresponds to it; but this is not
to be confused with the false opinion that I
understand ”aRb” when I know that ”aRb or
not-aRb” is the case.
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But the form of a proposition symbolizes in
the following way: Let us consider symbols of
the form ”xRy”; to these correspond primarily
pairs of objects, of which one has the name ”x”,
the other the name ”y”. The x’s & y’s stand in
various relations to each other, among others
the relation R holds between some, but not
between others. I know now determine the sense
of ”xRy” by laying down: when the facts behave
in regard to ”xRy” so that the meaning of ”x”
stands in the relation R to the meaning of ”y”,
then I say that they [the facts] are ”of like
sense” [”gleichsinnig”] with the proposition
”xRy”; otherwise, ”of opposite sense”
[entgegengesetzt”]; I correlate the facts to the
symbol ”xRy” by thus dividing them into those of
like sense & those of opposite sense. To this
correlation corresponds the correlation of name
& meaning. Both are psychological. Thus I
understand the form ”xRy” when I know that it
discriminates the behaviour of x & y according
as these stand in the relation R or not. In this
way I extract from all possible relations the
relation R, as, by a name, I extract its meaning
from among all possible things.
Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to say:
We understand the proposition p when we know
that ’”p” is true’ ≡ p; for this would naturally
always be the case if accidentally the
propositions to right & left of the symbol ”≡”
were both true or both false. We require not
only an equivalence, but a formal equivalence,
which is bound up with the introduction of the
form of p.
The sense of an ab-function of p is a
function of the sense of p.
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The ab-functions use the discrimination of
facts, which their arguments bring forth, in
order to generate new discriminations.
Only facts can express sense, a class of
names cannot. This is easily shown.
There is no thing which is the form of a
proposition, & no name which is the name of a
form. Accordingly we can also not say that a
relation which in certain cases holds between
things holds sometimes between forms & things.
This goes against Russell’s theory of judgment.
It is very easy to forget that, tho’ the
propositions of a form can be either true or
false, each one of these propositions can only
be either true or false, not both.
Among the facts which make ”p or q” true,
there are some which make ”p & q” true; but the
class which makes ”p or q” true is different
from the class which makes ”p & q” true; &
only this is what matters. For we introduce
this class, as it were, when we introduce
ab-functions.
A very natural objection to the way in
which I have introduced e.g. propositions of the
form xRy is that by it propositions such as
(∃x,y).xRy & similar ones are not explained,
which yet obviously have in common with aRb what
cRd has in common with aRb. But when we
introduced propositions of the form xRy we
mentioned no one particular proposition of this
form; & we only need to introduce (∃x,y).ϕ(x,y)
for all ϕ’s in any way which makes the sense of
these propositions dependent on the sense of all
propositions of the form ϕ(a,b), & thereby the
justification of our procedure is proved.
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The indefinables of logic must be
independent of each other. If an indefinable is
introduced, it must be introduced in all
combinations in which it can occur. We cannot
therefore introduce it first for one
combination, then for another; e.g., if the form
xRy has been introduced, it must henceforth be
understood in propositions of the form aRb just
in the same way as in propositions such as
(∃x,y). xRy & others. We must not introduce it
first for one class of cases, then for the
other; for it would remain doubtful if its
meaning was the same in both cases, & there
would be no ground for using the same manner of
combining symbols in both cases. In short, for
the introduction of indefinable symbols &
classes combinations of symbols the same holds,
mutatis mutandis, that Frege has said for the
introduction of symbols by definitions.
It is a priori likely that the introduction
of atomic propositions is fundamental for the
understanding of all other kinds of
propositions. In fact the understanding of
general propositions obviously depends on that
of atomic propositions.
Cross-definability in the realm of general
propositions leads to the quite similar
questions to those in the realm of ab-functions.
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When we say ”A believes p”, this sounds, it
is true, as if here we could substitute a proper
name for ”p”; but we can see that here a sense,
not a meaning, is concerned, if we say ”A
believes that ’p’ is true”; & in order to make
the direction of p even more explicit, we might
say ”A believes that ’p’ is true & ’not-p’ is
false”. Here the bi-polarity of p is expressed,
& it seems that we shall only be able to express
the proposition ”A believes p” correctly by the
ab-notation; say by making ”A” have a relation
to the poles ”a” & ”b” of a-p-b.
The epistemological questions concerning the
nature of judgment & belief cannot be solved
without a correct apprehension of the form of
the proposition.
The ab-notation shows the dependence of or
& not, & thereby that they are not to be
employed as simultaneous indefinables.
Not: ”The complex sign ’aRb’” says that a
stands in the relation R to b; but that ’a’
stands in a certain relation to ’b’ says that
aRb.
In philosophy there are no deductions: it
is purely descriptive.
Philosophy gives no pictures of reality.
Philosophy can neither confirm nor confute
scientific investigation.
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Philosophy consists of logic & metaphysics:
logic is its basis.
Epistemology is the philosophy of
psychology.
Distrust of grammar is the first requisite
for philosophizing.
Propositions can never be indefinables, for
they are always complex. That also words like
”ambulo” are complex appears in the fact that
their root with a different termination gives a
different sense.
Only the doctrine of general indefinables
permits us to understand the nature of
functions. Neglect of this doctrine leads to an
impenetrable thicket.
Philosophy is the doctrine of the logical
form of scientific propositions (not only of
primitive propositions).
The word ”philosophy” ought always to
designate something over or under, but not
beside, the natural sciences.
Judgment, command & question [&|a]ll
stand on the same level; but all have in common
the propositional form, which does interests us.
The construction structure of the sentence
proposition must be recognized, the rest comes
of itself. But ordinary language conceals the
structure of the proposition: in it, relations
look like predicates, predicates like names,
etc.
Facts cannot be named.
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It is easy to suppose that ”individual”,
”particular”, ”complex” etc. are primitive ideas
of logic. Russell e.g. says ”individual” &
”matrix” are ”primitive ideas”. This error
presumably is to be explained by the fact that,
by employment of variables instead of the
generality-signs, it comes to seem as if logic
dealt with things which have been deprived of
all properties except thing-hood, & with
propositions deprived of all properties except
complexity. We forget that the indefinables of
symbols [Urbilder von Zeichen] only occur under
the generality-sign, never outside it.
Just as people used to struggle to bring
all propositions into the subject-predicate
form, so now it is natural to conceive every
proposition as expressing a relation, which is
just as incorrect. What is justified in this
desire is fully satisfied by Russell’s theory of
manufactured relations.
One of the most natural attempts at
solution consists in regarding ”not-p” as ”the
opposite of p”, where then ”opposite” would be
the indefinable relation. But it is easy to see
that every such attempt to replace the
ab-functions by descriptions must fail.
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The false assumption that propositions are
names leads us to believe that there must be
logical objects: for the meanings of logical
propositions will have to be such things.
A correct explanation of logical
propositions must give them a unique position as
against all other propositions.
No proposition can say anything about
itself, because the symbol of the proposition
cannot be contained in itself; this must be the
basis of the theory of logical types.
Every proposition which says something
indefinable about a thing is a subject-predicate
proposition; every proposition which says
something indefinable about two things expresses
a dual relation between these things, & so on.
Thus every proposition which contains only one
name & one indefinable form is a
subject-predicate proposition, & so on. An
indefinable simple sign symbol can only be a
name, & therefore we can know, by the symbol of
an atomic proposition, whether it is a
subject-predicate proposition.
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I. Bi-polarity of propositions: sense & meaning,
truth & falsehood.
II. Analysis of atomic propositions: general
indefinables, predicates, etc.
III. Analysis of molecular fu propositions:
ab-functions.
IV. Analysis of general propositions22
[IV|V]. Principles of symbolism: what symbolizes
in a symbol. Facts for facts.
V‹I›. Types
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This is the symbol for
~p ∨ ~q
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SUMMARY.
‹III› One reason for thinking the old notation
wrong is that it is very unlikely that from every
proposition p an infinite number of other
propositions not-not-p, not-not-not-not-p, etc.,
should follow.
‹IV› If only those signs which contain proper
names were complex then propositions containing
nothing but apparent variables would be simple.
Then what about their denials?
‹I› The verb of a proposition cannot be ”is true”
or ”is false”, but whatever is true or false must
already contain the verb.
Deductions only proceed according to the laws
of deduction, but these laws cannot justify the
deduction.
‹I› One reason for supposing that not all
propositions which have more than one argument are
relational propositions is that if they were, the
relations of judgment and inference would have to
hold between an arbitrary number of things.
‹II› Every proposition which seems to be about a
complex can be analysed into a proposition about
its constituents and about the proposition which
describes the complex perfectly; i.e., that
proposition which is equivalent to saying the
complex exists.
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‹I› The idea that propositions are names of
complexes suggests that whatever is not a proper
name is a sign for a relation. Because spatial
complexes* * consists of Things and Relations only
and the idea of a complex is taken from space.
‹VI› In a proposition convert all its indefinables
into variables; there then remains a class of
propositions which is not all propositions but a
type.
‹VI› There are thus two ways in which signs are
similar. The names Socrates and Plato are similar:
they are both names. But whatever they have in
common must not be introduced before Socrates and
Plato are introduced. The same applies to a
subject-predicate form etc. Therefore, thing,
proposition, subject-predicate form, etc., are not
indefinables, i.e., types are not indefinables.
‹I› When we say A judges that etc., then we have
to mention a whole proposition which A judges. It
will not do either to mention only its
constituents, or its constituents and form, but
not in the proper order. This shows that a
proposition itself must occur in the statement
that it is judged; however, for instance, ”not-p”
may be explained, the question, ”What is negated”
must have a meaning.
〈* Russell - for instance imagines every fact as a
spatial complex. 〉 23
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‹I› To understand a proposition p it is not
enough to know that p implies ’”p” is true’, but
we must also know that ~p implies ”p is false”.
This shows the bi-polarity of the proposition.
‹III› To every molecular function a WF* scheme
corresponds. Therefore we may use the WF scheme
itself instead of the function. Now what the WF
scheme does is, it correlates the letters W and F
with each proposition. These two letters are the
poles of atomic propositions. Then the scheme
correlates another W and F to these poles. In this
notation all that matters is the correlation of
the outside poles to the poles of the atomic
propositions. Therefore not-not-p is the same
symbol as p. And therefore we shall never get two
symbols for the same molecular function.
‹I› The meaning of a proposition is the fact
which actually corresponds to it.
‹III› As the ab functions of atomic propositions
are bi-polar propositions again we can perform ab
operations on them. We shall, by doing so,
correlate two new outside poles via the old
outside poles to the poles of the atomic
propositions.
〈* W-F = Wahr-Falsch. 〉 23
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‹III› The symbolising fact in a-p-b is that, say* a
is on the left of p and b on the right of p; then
the correlation of new poles is to be transitive,
so that for instance if a new pole a in whatever
way i.e. via whatever poles is correlated to the
inside a, the symbol is not changed thereby. It is
therefore possible to construct all possible ab
functions by performing one ab operation
repeatedly, and we can therefore talk of all ab
functions as of all those functions which can be
obtained by performing this ab operation
repeatedly.
[Note by B.R. ab means the same as WF, which
means true-false.]
‹III› Naming is like pointing. A function is like a
line dividing points of a plane into right and
left ones; then ”p or not-p” has no meaning
because it does not divide the plane.
‹III› But though a particular proposition ”p or
not-p” has no meaning, a general proposition ”for
all p’s, p or not-p” has a meaning because this
does not contain the nonsensical function ”p or
not-p” but the function ”p or not-q” just as ”for
all x’s xRx” contains the function ”xRy”.
〈* This is quite arbitrary but, if we once have
fixed on which order the poles have to stand we
must of course stick to our convention. If for
instance ”a p b” says p then b p a says nothing.
(It does not say ~p) But a - a p b - b is the same
symbol as apb (here the ab function vanishes
automatically) for here the new poles are related
to the same side of p as the old ones. The
question is always: how are the new poles
correlated to p compared with the way the old
poles are correlated to ~p. 〉 23
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‹I› A proposition is a standard to which all
facts behave, with names it is otherwise; it is
thus bi-polarity and sense comes in; just as one
arrow behaves to another arrow by being in the
same sense or the opposite, so a fact behaves to a
proposition.
‹II› The form of a proposition has meaning in the
following way. Consider a symbol ”xRy”. To symbols
of this form correspond couples of things whose
names are respectively ”x” and ”y”. The things x y
stand to one another in all sorts of relations,
amongst others some stand in the relation R, and
some not; just as I single out a particular thing
by a particular name I single out all behaviours
of the points x and y with respect to the relation
R. I say that if an x stands in the relation R to
a y the sign ”xRy” is to be called true to the
fact and otherwise false. This is a definition of
sense.
In my theory p has the same meaning as not-p
but opposite sense. The meaning is the fact. The
proper theory of judgment must make it impossible
to judge nonsense.
‹I› It is not strictly true to say that we
understand a proposition p if we know that p is
equivalent to ”p is true” for this would be the
case if accidentally both were true or false. What
is wanted is the formal equivalence with respect
to the forms of the proposition, i.e., all the
general indefinables involved. The sense of an ab
function of a proposition is a function of its
sense. There are only unasserted propositions.
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‹I› Assertion is merely psychological. In not-p, p is
exactly the same as if it stands alone; this point
is absolutely fundamental. Among the facts that
make ”p or q” true there are also facts which make
”p and q” true; if propositions have only meaning,
we ought, in such a case, to say that these two
propositions are identical, but in fact, their
sense is different for we have introduced sense by
talking of all p’s and all q’s. Consequently the
molecular propositions will only be used in cases
where their ab function stands under a generality
sign or enters into another function such as ”I
believe that, etc”., because then the sense
enters.
‹I› In ”a judges p” p cannot be replaced by a
proper name. This appears if we substitute ”a
judges that p is true and not p is false”. The
proposition ”a judges p” consists of the proper
name a, the proposition p with its 2 poles, and a
being related to both of these poles in a certain
way. This is obviously not a relation in the
ordinary sense.
‹III›‹V› The ab notation makes it clear that not and
or are dependent on one another and we can
therefore not use them as simultaneous
indefinables. Same objections in the case of
apparent variables to the usual1 old indefinables,
as in the case of molecular functions. The
application of the ab notation to apparent
variable propositions becomes clear if we consider
that, for instance, the proposition ”for all x,
ϕx” is to be true when ϕx is true for all x’s and
false when ϕx is false for some x’s. We see that
some and all occur simultaneously in the proper
apparent variable notation.
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‹IV› The notation is:
for (x) ϕx : a - (x) - a ϕx b - (∃ x) - b
and
for (∃x) ϕx : a - (∃x) - a ϕx b - (x) - b
Old definitions now become tautologous.
‹V› In aRb it is not the complex that symbolises
but the fact that the symbol a stands in a certain
relation to the symbol b. Thus facts are
symbolised by facts, or more correctly: that a
certain thing is the case in the symbol says that
a certain thing is the case in the world.
‹I› Judgment, question and command are all on the
same level. What interests logic in them is only
the unasserted proposition. Facts cannot be named.
‹VI› A proposition cannot occur in itself. This is the
fundamental truth of the theory of types.
Every proposition that says something
indefinable about one thing is a subject-predicate
proposition, and so on.
‹VI› Therefore we can recognise a
subject-predicate proposition if we know it
contains only one name and one form, etc. This
gives the construction of types. Hence the type of
a proposition can be recognized by its symbol
alone.
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What is essential in a correct
apparent-variable notation is this:- (1) it must
mention a type of propositions; (2) it must show
which components of a proposition of this type are
constants.
‹VI› [Components are forms and constituents.]
Take (ϕ). ϕ!x. Then if we describe the kind
of symbols, for which ϕ! stands and which, by the
above, is enough to determine the type, then
automatically ”(ϕ). ϕ! x” cannot be fitted by this
description, because it CONTAINS ”ϕ!x” and the
description is to describe ALL that symbolises in
symbols of the ϕ! kind. If the description is thus
complete vicious circles can just as little occur
as for instance (ϕ). (X)ϕ (where (X)ϕ is a
subject-predicate proposition).
85
Item 201a-2 Recto Page B1
1
First MS.
‹II› Indefinables are of two sorts: names, and
forms. Propositions cannot consist of names alone;
they cannot be classes of names. A name can not
only occur in two different propositions, but can
occur in the same way in both.
Propositions [which are symbols having
reference to facts] are themselves facts: that
this inkpot is on this table may express that I
sit in this chair.
‹V› It can never express the common
characteristic of two objects that we designate
them by the same name but by two different ways of
designation, for, since names are arbitrary, we
might also choose different names, and where then
would be the common element in the designations?
Nevertheless one is always tempted, in a
difficulty, to take refuge in different ways of
designation.
‹I› Frege said ”propositions are names”; Russell
said ”propositions correspond to complexes”. Both
are false; and especially false is the statement
”propositions are names of complexes.”
‹IV› It is easy to suppose that only such symbols
are complex as contain names of objects, and that
accordingly ” (∃x,ϕ). ϕx” or ”(∃x,y). x R y” must
be simple. It is then natural to call the first of
these the name of a form, the second the name of a
relation. But in that case what is the meaning of
(e.g.) ”~(∃x,y). x R y”? Can we put ”not” before a
name?
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‹III› The reason why ”~Socrates” means nothing is
that ”~x” does not express a property of x.
‹I› There are positive and negative facts: if the
proposition ”this rose is not red” is true, then
what it signifies is negative. But the occurrence
of the word ”not” does not indicate this unless we
know that the signification of the proposition
”this rose is red” (when it is true) is positive.
It is only from both, the negation and the negated
proposition, that we can conclude to a
characteristic of the significance of the whole
proposition. (We are not here speaking of
negations of general propositions, i.e. of such as
contain apparent variables. Negative facts only
justify the negations of atomic propositions.)
Positive and negative facts there are, but
not true and false facts.
‹I› If we overlook the fact that propositions
have a sense which is independent of their truth
or falsehood, it easily seems as if true and false
were two equally justified relations between the
sign and what is signified. (We might then say
e.g. that ”q”24 signifies in the true way what
”not-q” signifies in the false way). But are not
true and false in fact equally justified? Could we
not express ourselves by means of false
propositions just as well as hitherto with true
ones, so long as we know that they are meant
falsely? No! For a proposition is then25 true when
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it is as we assert in this proposition; and
accordingly if by ”q” we mean ”not-q”, and it is
as we mean to assert, then in the new
interpretation ”q” is actually true and not false.
But it is important that we can mean the same by
”q” as by ”not-q”, for it shows that neither to
the symbol ”not” nor to the manner of its
combination with ”q” does a characteristic of the
denotation of ”q” correspond.
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Second MS.
‹II› We must be able to understand propositions
which we have never heard before. But every
proposition is a new symbol. Hence we must have
general indefinable symbols; these are unavoidable
if propositions are not all indefinable.
‹III› Whatever corresponds in reality to compound
propositions must not be more than what
corresponds to their several atomic propositions.
Not only must logic not deal with
[particular] things, but just as little with
relations and predicates.
‹IV› There are no propositions containing real
variables.
‹I› What corresponds in reality to a proposition
depends upon whether it is true or false. But we
must be able to understand a proposition without
knowing if it is true or false.
What we know when we understand a proposition
is this: We know what is the case if the
proposition is true, and what is the case if it is
false. But we do not know [necessarily] whether it
is true or false.
Propositions are not names.
‹VI› We can never distinguish one logical type
from another by attributing a property to members
of the one which we deny to members of the other.
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‹II› Symbols are not what they seem to be. In ”a R
b”, ”R” looks like a substantive, but is not one.
What symbolizes in ”a R b” is that R occurs
between a and b. Hence ”R” is not the indefinable
in ”a R b”. Similarly in ”ϕx”, ”ϕ” looks like a
substantive but is not one; in ”~p”, ”~” looks
like ”ϕ” but is not like it. This is the first
thing that indicates that there may not be logical
constants. A reason against them is the generality
of logic: logic cannot treat a special set of
things.
‹III› Molecular propositions contain nothing beyond
what is contained in their atoms; they add no
material information above that contained in their
atoms.
All that is essential about molecular
functions is their T-F schema [i.e. the statement
of the cases when they are true and the cases when
they are false].
‹V› Alternative indefinability shows that the
indefinables have not been reached.
‹I› Every proposition is essentially true-false:
to understand it, we must know both what must be
the case if it is true, and what must be the case
if it is false. Thus a proposition has two poles,
corresponding to the case of its truth and the
case of its falsehood. We call this the sense of a
proposition.
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‹V› In regard to notation, it is important to
note that not every feature of a symbol
symbolizes. In two molecular functions which have
the same T-F schema, what symbolizes must be the
same. In ”not-not-p”, ”not-p” does not occur; for
”not-not-p” is the same as ”p”, and therefore, if
”not-p” occurred in ”not-not-p”, it would occur in
”p”.
‹III› Logical indefinables cannot be predicates or
relations, because propositions, owing to sense,
cannot have predicates or relations. Nor are ”not”
and ”or”, like judgment, analogous to predicates
or relations, because they do not introduce
anything new.
‹IV› Propositions are always complex even if they
contain no names.
‹II› A proposition must be understood when all its
indefinables are understood. The indefinables in
”a R b” are introduced as follows:
”a” is indefinable;
”b” is indefinable;
Whatever ”x” and ”y” may mean, ”x R y” says
something indefinable about their meaning.
‹V› A complex symbol must never be introduced as
a single indefinable. [Thus e.g. no proposition is
indefinable). For if one of its parts occurs also
in another connection, it must there be
re-introduced. And would it then mean the same?
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The ways by which we introduce our
indefinables must permit us to construct all
propositions that have sense [? meaning] from
these indefinables alone. It is easy to introduce
”all” and ”some” in a way that will make the
construction of (say) ”(x, y). x R y” possible
from ”all” and ”x R y” as introduced before.
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3rd. MS.
‹I› An analogy for the theory of truth: Consider
a black patch on white paper; then we can describe
the form of the patch by mentioning, for each
point of the surface, whether it is white or
black. To the fact that a point is black
corresponds a positive fact, to the fact that a
point is white (not black) corresponds a negative
fact. If I designate a point of the surface (one
of Frege’s ”truth-values”), this is as if I set up
an assumption to be decided upon. But in order to
be able to say of a point that it is black or that
it is white, I must first know when a point is to
be called black and when it is to be called white.
In order to be able to say that ”p” is true (or
false), I must first have determined under what
circumstances I call a proposition true, and
thereby I determine the sense of a proposition.
The point in which the analogy fails is this: I
can indicate a point of the paper what is white26
and black, but to a proposition without sense
nothing corresponds, for it does not designate a
thing (truth-value), whose properties might be
called ”false” or ”true”; the verb of a
proposition is not ”is true” or ”is false”, as
Frege believes, but what is true must already
contain the verb.
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‹I› The comparison of language and reality is
like that of retinal image and visual image: to
the blind spot nothing in the visual image seems
to correspond, and thereby the boundaries of the
blind spot determine the visual image - as true
negations of atomic propositions determine
reality.
‹III› Logical inferences can, it is true, be made
in accordance with Frege’s or Russell’s laws of
deduction, but this cannot justify the inference;
and therefore they are not primitive propositions
of logic. If p follows from q, it can also be
inferred from q, and the ”manner of deduction” is
indifferent.
‹IV› Those symbols which are called propositions
in which ”variables occur” are in reality not
propositions at all, but only schemes of
propositions, which only become propositions when
we replace the variables by constants. There is no
proposition which is expressed by ”x = x”, for ”x”
has no signification; but there is a proposition
”(x). x = x” and propositions such as ”Socrates =
Socrates” etc.
‹IV› In books on logic, no variables ought to
occur, but only the general propositions which
justify the use of variables. It follows that the
so-called definitions of logic are not
definitions, but only schemes of definitions, and
instead of these we ought to put general
propositions; and similarly the so-called
primitive ideas (Urzeichen) of logic are not
primitive ideas, but the schemes of them. The
mistaken idea that there
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are things called facts or complexes and relations
easily leads to the opinion that there must be a
relation of questioning10 〈(?) 〉 27 to the facts, and
then the question arises whether a relation can
hold between an arbitrary number of things, since
a fact can follow from arbitrary cases. It is a
fact that the proposition which e.g. expresses
that q follows from p and p ⊃ q is this: p. p ⊃ q.
⊃ p.q.q.
‹I› At a pinch, one is tempted to interpret
”not-p” as ”everything else, only not p”. That
from a single fact p an infinity of others,
not-not-p etc., follow, is hardly credible. Man
possesses an innate capacity for constructing
symbols with which some sense can be expressed,
without having the slightest idea what each word
signifies. The best example of this is
mathematics, for man has until lately used the
symbols for numbers without knowing what they
signify or that they signify nothing.
‹II› Russell’s ”complexes” were to have the useful
property of being compounded, and were to combine
with this the agreeable property that they could
be treated like ”simples”. But this alone made
them unserviceable as logical types, since there
would have been significance in asserting, of a
simple, that it was complex. But a property cannot
be a logical type.
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‹II› Every statement about apparent complexes can
be resolved into the logical sum of a statement
about the constituents and a statement about the
proposition which describes the complex
completely. How, in each case, the resolution is
to be made, is an important question, but its
answer is not unconditionally necessary for the
construction of logic.
‹III› That ”or” and ”not” etc. are not relations in
the same sense as ”right” and ”left” etc., is
obvious to the plain man. The possibility of
cross-definitions in the old logical indefinables
shows, of itself, that these are not the right
indefinables, and, even more conclusively, that
they do not denote relations.
‹VI› If we change a constituent a of a proposition
ϕ(a) into a variable, then there is a class
~
p {(∃x). ϕ(x) = p }.
This class in general still depends upon what, by
an arbitrary convention, we mean by ”ϕ(x)”. But if
we change into variables all those symbols whose
significance was arbitrarily determined, there is
still such a class. But this is now not dependent
upon any convention, but only upon the nature of
the symbol ”ϕ(x)”. It corresponds to a logical
type.
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‹VI› Types can never be distinguished from each
other by saying (as is often done) that one has
these but the other has those properties, for this
presupposes that there is a meaning in asserting
all these properties of both types. But from this
it follows that, at best, these properties may be
types, but certainly not the objects of which they
are asserted.
‹I› At a pinch we are always inclined to
explanations of logical functions of propositions
which aim at introducing into the function either
only the constituents of these propositions, or
only their form, etc. etc.; and we overlook that
ordinary language would not contain the whole
propositions if it did not need them: However,
e.g., ”not-p” may be explained, there must always
be a meaning given to the question ”what is
denied?”
‹III› The very possibility of Frege’s explanations
of ”not-p” and ”if p then q”, from which it
follows that ”not-not-p” denotes the same as p,
makes it probable that there is some method of
designation in which ”not-not-p” corresponds to
the same symbol as ”p”. But if this method of
designation suffices for logic, it must be the
right one.
‹I› Names are points, propositions arrows - they
have sense. The sense of a proposition is
determined by the two poles true and false. The
form of a proposition is like a straight line,
which divides all points of a plane into right and
left. The line does this autom at ically, the form
of proposition only by convention.
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‹II› Just as little as we are concerned, in logic,
with the relation of a name to its meaning, just
so little are we concerned with the relation of a
proposition to reality, but we want to know the
meaning of names and the sense of propositions as
we introduce an indefinable concept ”A” by saying:
”’A’ denotes something indefinable”, so we
introduce e.g. the form of propositions a R b by
saying: ”For all meanings of ”x” and ”y”, ”x R y”
expresses something indefinable about x and y”.
‹III› In place of every proposition ”p”, let us
write ”abp”. Let every correlation of propositions
to each other or of names to propositions be
effected by a correlation of their poles ”a” and
”b”. Let this correlation be transitive. Then
accordingly ”a-ab-bp” is the same symbol as ”abp”.
Let n propositions be given. I then call a ”class
of poles” of these propositions every class of n
members, of which each is a pole of one of the n
propositions, so that one member corresponds to
each proposition. I then correlate with each class
of poles one of two poles (a and b). The sense of
the symbolizing fact thus constructed I cannot
define, but I know it.
‹III› If p = not-not-p etc., this shows that the
traditional method of symbolism is wrong, since it
allows a plurality of symbols with the same sense;
and thence it follows that, in analyzing such
propositions, we must not be guided by Russell’s
method of symbolizing.
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‹V› It is to be remembered that names are not
things, but classes: ”A” is the same letter as
”A”. This has the most important consequences for
every symbolic language.
‹I› Neither the sense nor the meaning of a
proposition is a thing. These words are incomplete
symbols.
‹V› It is impossible to dispense with
propositions in which the same argument occurs in
different positions. It is obviously useless to
replace ϕ(a, a) by ϕ(a, b). a = b.
‹III› Since the ab-functions of p are again
bi-polar propositions, we can form ab-functions of
them, and so on. In this way a series of
propositions will arise, in which in general the
symbolizing facts will be the same in several
members. If now we find an ab-function of such a
kind that by repeated application of it every
ab-function can be generated, then we can
introduce the totality of ab-functions as the
totality of those that are generated by
application of this function. Such a function is
~p ∨ ~q.
‹III› It is easy to suppose a contradiction in the
fact that on the one hand every possible complex
proposition is a simple ab-function of simple
propositions, and that on the other hand the
repeated application of one ab-function suffices
to generate all these propositions. If e.g. an
affirmation can be generated by double negation,
is negation in any sense contained in affirmation?
Does ”p” deny ”not-p” or assert ”p”, or both? And
how do
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matters stand with the definition of ”⊃” by ”∨”
and ”.”, or of ”∨” by ”.” and ”⊃”? And how e.g.
shall we introduce p[”||]q (i.e. ~p ∨ ~q), if not
by saying that this expression says something
indefinable about all arguments p and q? But the
ab-functions must be introduced as follows: The
function p[”||]q is merely a mechanical instrument
for constructing all possible symbols of
ab-functions. The symbols arising by repeated
application of the symbol ”|” do not contain the
symbol ”p|q”. We need a rule according to which we
can form all symbols of ab-functions, in order to
be able to speak of the class of them; and we now
speak of them e.g. as those symbols of functions
which can be generated by repeated application of
the operation ”|”. And we say now: For all p’s and
q’s, ”p|q” says something indefinable about the
sense of those simple propositions which are
contained in p and q.
‹I› The assertion-sign is logically quite without
significance. It only shows, in Frege and
Whitehead and Russell, that these authors hold the
propositions so indicated to be true. ” ”
therefore belongs as little to the proposition as
(say) the number of the proposition. A proposition
cannot possibly assert of itself that it is true.
Every right theory of judgment must make it
impossible for me to judge that this table
penholders the book. Russell’s theory does not
satisfy this requirement.
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‹I› It is clear that we understand propositions
without knowing whether they are true or false.
But we can only know the meaning of a proposition
when we know if it is true or false. What we
understand is the sense of the proposition.
‹III› The assumption of the existence of logical
objects makes it appear remarkable that in the
sciences propositions of the form ”p ∨ q”, ”p ⊃
q”, etc. are only then not provisional when ”∨”
and ”⊃” stand within the scope of a
generality-sign [apparent variable].
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4th. MS.
‹II› If we formed all possible atomic
propositions, the world would be completely
described if we declared the truth or falsehood of
each. [I doubt this.]
‹I› The chief characteristic of my theory is
that, in it, p has the same meaning as not-p.
‹II› A false theory of relations makes it easily
seem as if the relation of fact and constituent
were the same as that of fact and fact which
follows from it. But the similarity of the two may
be expressed thus: ϕa. ⊃.ϕ,a a = a.
‹II› If a word creates a world so that in it the
principles of logic are true, it thereby creates a
world in which the whole of mathematics holds; and
similarly it could not create a world in which a
proposition was true, without creating its
constituents.
‹III› Signs of the form ”p ∨ ~p” are senseless, but
not the proposition ”(p). p ∨ ~p”. If I know that
this rose is either red or not red, I know
nothing. The same holds of all ab-functions.
‹I› To understand a proposition means to know
what is the case if it is true. Hence we can
understand it without knowing if it is true. We
understand it when we understand its constituents
and forms. If we know the meaning of ”a” and ”b”,
and if we know what ”x R y” means for all x’s and
y’s, then we also understand ”a R b”.
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‹I› I understand the proposition ”a R b” when I
know that either the fact that a R b or the fact
that not a R b corresponds to it; but this is not
to be confused with the false opinion that I
understood ”a R b” when I know that ”a R b or not
a R b” is the case.
‹II› But the form of a proposition symbolizes in
the following way: Let us consider symbols of the
form ”x R y”; to these correspond primarily pairs
of objects, of which one has the name ”x”, the
other the name ”y”. The x’s and y’s stand in
various relations to each other, among others the
relation R holds between some, but not between
others. I now determine the sense of ”x R y” by
laying down: when the facts behave in regard to ”x
R y” so that the meaning of ”x” stands in the
relation R to the meaning of ”y”, then I say that
they [the facts] are ”of like sense”
[”gleichsinnig”] with the proposition ”x R y”;
otherwise, ”of opposite sense” [entgegengesetzt”];
I correlate the facts to the symbol ”x R y” by
thus dividing them into those of like sense and
those of opposite sense. To this correlation
corresponds the correlation of name and meaning.
Both are psychological. Thus I understand the form
”x R y” when I know that it discriminates the
behaviour of x and y according as these stand in
the relation R or not. In this way I extract from
all possible relations the relation R, as, by a
name, I extract its meaning from among all
possible things.
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‹I› Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to say: we
understand the proposition p when we know that
’”p” is true’ ≡ p; for this would naturally always
be the case if accidentally the propositions to
right and left of the symbol ”≡” were both true or
both false. We require not only an equivalence,
but a formal equivalence, which is bound up with
the introduction of the form of p.
‹III› The sense of an ab-function of p is a
function of the sense of p.
‹III› The ab-functions use the discrimination of
facts, which their arguments bring forth, in order
to generate new discriminations.
‹V› Only facts can express sense, a class of
names cannot. This is easily shown.
‹II› There is no thing which is the form of a
proposition, and no name which is the name of a
form. Accordingly we can also not say that a
relation which in certain cases holds between
things holds sometimes between forms and things.
This goes against Russell’s theory of judgment.
28[It is very easy to forget that, though the
propositions of a form can be either true or
false, each one of these propositions can only be
either true or false, not both.]28
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‹III› Among the facts which make ”p or q” true,
there are some which make ”p and q” true; but the
class which makes ”p or q” true is different from
the class which makes ”p and q” true; and only
this is what matters. For we introduce this class,
as it were, when we introduce ab-functions.
‹IV› A very natural objection to the way in which
I have introduced e.g. propositions of the form x
R y is that by it propositions such as (∃. x. y).
x R y and similar ones are not explained, which
yet obviously have in common with a R b what c R d
has in common with a R b. But when we introduce
propositions of the form x R y we mentioned no one
particular proposition of this form; and we only
need to introduce (∃ x, y). ϕ(x, y) for all ϕ’s in
any way which makes the sense of these
propositions dependent on the sense of all
propositions of the form ϕ(a, b), and thereby the
justification2ness1 of our procedure is proved.
‹V› The indefinables of logic must be independent
of each other. If an indefinable is introduced, it
must be introduced in all combinations in which it
can occur. We cannot therefore introduce it first
for one combination, then for another; e.g., if
the form x R y has been introduced, it must
henceforth be understood in propositions of the
form a R b just in the same way as in propositions
such as (∃x, y). x R y and others. We must not
introduce it first for one class of cases, then
for the other; for it would remain doubtful if its
meaning was the same in
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both cases, and there would be no ground for using
the same manner of combining symbols in both
cases. In short, for the introduction of
indefinable symbols and combinations of symbols
the same holds, mutatis mutandis, that Frege has
said for the introduction of symbols by
definitions.
‹III› It is a priori likely that the introduction
of atomic propositions is fundamental for the
understanding of all other kinds of propositions.
In fact the understanding of general propositions
obviously depends on that of atomic propositions.
‹IV› Cross-definability in the realm of general
propositions leads to the2 quite similar questions
to those in the realm of ab-functions.
‹I› When we say ”A believes p”, this sounds, it
is true, as if here we could substitute a proper
name for ”p”; but we can see that here a sense,
not a meaning, is concerned, if we say ”A believes
that ’p’ is true”; and in order to make the
direction of p even more explicit, we might say ”A
believes that ’p’ is true and ’not-p’ is false”.
Here the bi-polarity of p is expressed and it
seems that we shall only be able to express the
proposition ”A believes p” correctly by the
ab-notation; say by making ”A” have a relation to
the poles ”a” and ”b” of a-p-b.
The epistemological questions concerning the
nature of judgment and belief cannot be solved
without a correct apprehension of the four10rm1 of
the proposition.
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‹III› The ab-notation shows the dependence of or
and not, and thereby that they are not to be
employed as simultaneous indefinables.
‹V› Not: ”The complex sign ’a R b’” says that a
stands in the relation R to b; but that ’a’ stands
in a certain relation to ’b’ says that a R b.
( 29[ 〈Preliminary 〉 6 In philosophy there are no
( deductions: it is purely descriptive.
( Philosophy gives no pictures of reality.
( Philosophy can neither confirm nor confute
( scientific investigation.
( Philosophy consists of logic and metaphysics:
( logic is its basis.
( Epistemology is the philosophy of psychology.
( Distrust of grammar is the first requisite
( for philosophizing.]29
28[Propositions can never be indefinables,
for they are always complex. That also words like
”ambulo” are complex appears in the fact that
their root with a different termination gives a
different sense.]28
‹II› Only the doctrine of general indefinables
permits us to understand the nature of functions.
Neglect of this doctrine leads to an impenetrable
thicket.
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( 29[ 〈Preliminary 〉 6
( Philosophy is the doctrine of the logical
( form of scientific propositions (not only of
( primitive propositions).
( The word ”philosophy” ought always to
( designate something over or under but not beside,
( the natural sciences.]29
‹I› Judgment, command and question all stand on
the same level; but all have in common the
propositional form, which does interest us.
‹I› The structure of the proposition must be
recognized, the rest comes of itself. But ordinary
language conceals the structure of the
proposition: in it, relations look like
predicates, predicates like names, etc.
Facts cannot be named.
‹VI› It is easy to suppose that ”individual”,
”particular”, ”complex” etc. are primitive ideas
of logic. Russell e.g. says ”individual” and
”matrix” are ”primitive ideas”. This error
presumably is to be explained by the fact that, by
employment of variables instead of the
generality-sign it comes to seem as if logic dealt
with things which have been deprived of all
properties except thing-hood, and with
propositions deprived of all properties except
complexity. We forget that the indefinables of
symbols [Urbilder von Zeichen] only occur under
the generality-sign, never outside it.
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‹IV› Just as people used to struggle to bring all
propositions into the subject-predicate form, so
now it is natural to conceive every proposition as
expressing a relation, which is just as incorrect.
What is justified in this desire is fully
satisfied by Russell’s theory of manufactured
relations.
‹I› One of the most natural attempts at solution
consists in regarding ”not-p” as ”the opposite of
p”, where then ”opposite” would be the indefinable
relation. But it is easy to see that every such
attempt to replace the ab-functions by
descriptions must fail.
‹I› The false assumption that propositions are
names leads us to believe that there must be
logical objects: for the meanings of logical
propositions will have to be such things.
〈Preliminary 〉 6
A correct explanation of logical propositions
must give them a unique position as against all
other propositions.
No proposition can say anything about itself,
because the symbol of the proposition cannot be
contained in itself; this must be the basis of the
theory of logical types.
‹VI› Every proposition which says something
indefinable about a thing is a subject-predicate
proposition; every proposition which says
something indefinable about two things expresses a
dual relation between these things, and so on.
Thus every proposition which contains only one
name and one indefinable form is a
subject-predicate proposition, and so on. An
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indefinable simple symbol can only be a name, and
therefore we can know, by the symbol of an atomic
proposition, whether it is a subject-predicate
proposition.
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SUMMARY.
One reason for thinking the old notation
wrong is that it is very unlikely that from every
proposition p an infinite number of other
propositions not-not-p, not-not-not-not-p, etc.,
should follow.
If only those signs which contain proper
names were complex then propositions containing
nothing but apparent variables would be simple.
Then what about their denials?
The verb of a proposition cannot be ”is
true” or ”is false”, but whatever is true or false
must already contain the verb.
Deductions only proceed according to the
laws of deduction, but these laws cannot justify
the deduction.
One reason for supposing that not all
propositions which have more than one argument are
relational propositions is that if they were, the
relations of judgment and inference would have to
hold between an arbitrary number of things.
Every proposition which seems to be about a
complex can be analysed into a proposition about
its constituents and about the proposition which
describes the complex perfectly; i.e., that
proposition which is equivalent to saying the
complex exists.
The idea that propositions are names of
complexes suggests that whatever is not a proper
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name is a sign for a relation. Because spatial
complexes* consist of Things and Relations only
and the idea of a complex is taken from space.
In a proposition convert all its
indefinables into variables; there then remains a
class of propositions which is not all
propositions but a type.
There are thus two ways in which signs are
similar. The names Socrates and Plato are similar:
they are both names. But whatever they have in
common must not be introduced before Socrates and
Plato are introduced. The same applies to a
subject-predicate form etc. Therefore, thing,
proposition, subject-predicate form, etc., are not
indefinables, i.e., types are not indefinables.
When we say A judges that etc., then we have
to mention a whole proposition which A judges. It
will not do either to mention only its
constituents, or its constituents and form, but
not in the proper order. This shows that a
proposition itself must occur in the statement
that it is judged; however, for instance, ”not-p”
may be explained, the question, ”What is negated”
must have a meaning.
To understand a proposition p it is not
enough to know that p implies ’”p” is true’, but
we must also know that ~p implies ”p is false”.
This shows the bi-polarity of the proposition.
To every molecular function a WF* scheme
corresponds. Therefore we may use the WF scheme
itself instead of the function. Now what the Wf
scheme does is, it correlates the letters W and F
with each proposition. These two letters are the
poles of atomic propositions. Then the scheme
correlates another W and F to these poles. In this
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notation all that matters is the correlation of
the outside poles to the poles of the atomic
propositions. Therefore not-not-p is the same
symbol as p. And therefore we shall never get two
symbols for the same molecular function.
〈* Russell - for instance imagines every fact as a
spatial complex.
* W-F = Wahr-Falsch. 〉 23
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‹⊗› The meaning of a proposition is the fact
which actually corresponds to it.
As the ab functions of atomic propositions
are bi-polar propositions again we can perform ab
operations on them. We shall, by doing so,
correlate two new outside poles via the old
outside poles to the poles of the atomic
propositions.
The symbolising fact in a-p-b is that, say*
a is on the left of p and b on the right of p;
then the correlation of new poles is to be
transitive, so that for instance if a new pole a
in whatever way i.e. via whatever poles is
correlated to the inside a, the symbol is not
changed thereby. It is therefore possible to
construct all possible ab functions by performing
one ab operation repeatedly, and we can therefore
talk of all ab functions as of all those functions
which can be obtained by performing this ab
operation repeatedly.
(Note by B.R. ab means the same as WF, which means
true-false.?)
Naming is like pointing. A function is like
a line dividing points of a plane into right and
left ones; then ”p or not-p” has no meaning
because it does not divide the plane.
But though a particular proposition ”p or
not-p” has no meaning, a general proposition ”for
all p’s, p or not-p” has a meaning because this
does not contain the nonsensical function ”p or
not-p” but the function ”p or not-q” just as ”for
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all x’s xRx” contains the function ”xRy”.
‹⊗› A proposition is a standard to which facts
behave, with names it is otherwise; it is thus
bi-polarity and sense comes in; just as one arrow
behaves to another arrow by being in the same
sense or the opposite, so a fact behaves to a
proposition.
‹⊗› The form of a proposition has meaning in the
following way. Consider a symbol ”xRy”. To symbols
of this form correspond couples of things whose
names are respectively ”x” and ”y”. The things x y
stand to one another in all sorts of relations,
amongst others some stand in the relation R, and
some not; just as I single out a particular thing
by a particular name I single out all behaviours
of the points x and y with respect to the relation
R. I say that if an x stands in the relation R to
a y the sign ”xRy” is to be called true to the
fact and otherwise false. This is a definition of
sense.
‹ ⊗› In my theory p has the same meaning as not-p
but opposite sense. The meaning is the fact. The
proper theory of judgment must make it impossible
to judge nonsense.
It is not strictly true to say that we
understand a proposition p if we know that p is
equivalent to ”p is true” for this would be the
case if accidentally both were true or false. What
is wanted is the formal equivalence with respect
to the forms of the proposition, i.e., all the
general indefinables involved. The sense of an ab
function of a proposition is a function of its
sense. There are only unasserted propositions.
Assertion is merely psychological. In not-p, p is
exactly the same as if it stands alone; this point
is absolutely fundamental. Among the facts that
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make ”p or q” true there are also facts which make
”p and q” true; if propositions have only meaning,
we ought, in such a case, to say that these two
〈* This is quite arbitrary but, if we once have
fixed on which order the poles have to stand we
must of course stick to our convention. If for
instance ”a p b” says p then b p a says nothing.
(It does not say p) But a - a p b - b is the same
symbol as apb (here the ab function vanishes
automatically) for here the new poles are related
to the same side of p as the old ones. The
question is always: how are the new poles
correlated to p compared with the way the old
poles are correlated to p. 〉 23
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propositions are identical, but in fact, their
sense is different for we have introduced sense by
talking of all p’s and all q’s. Consequently the
molecular propositions will only be used in cases
where their ab function stands under a generality
sign or enters into another function such as ”I
believe that, etc”., because then the sense
enters.
In ”a judges p” p cannot be replaced by a
proper name. This appears if we substitute ”a
judges that p is true and not p is false”. The
proposition ”a judges p” consists of the proper
name a, the proposition p with its 2 poles, and a
being related to both of these poles in a certain
way. This is obviously not a relation in the
ordinary sense.
The ab notation makes it clear that not and
or are dependent on one another and we can
therefore not use them as simultaneous
indefinables. Same objections in the case of
apparent variables to the usual indefinables, as
in the case of molecular functions. The
application of the ab notation to apparent
variable propositions becomes clear if we consider
that, for instance, the proposition ”for all x, φ
x” is to be true when φ x is true for all x’s and
false when φ x is false for some x’s. We see that
some and all occur simultaneously in the proper
apparent variable notation. The Notation is:
for (x) φ x : a - (x) - a φ x b - ( x) - b
and
for ( x) x : a - ( x) - a φ x b - (x) - b
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Old definitions now become tautologous.
30[In aRb it is not the complex that
symbolises but the fact that the symbol a stands
in a certain relation to the symbol b. Thus facts
are symbolised by facts, or more correctly: that a
certain thing is the case in the symbol says that
a certain thing is the case in the world.]30
Judgment, question and command are all on
the same level. What interests logic in them is
only the unasserted proposition. Facts cannot be
named.
A proposition cannot occur in itself. This
is the fundamental truth of the theory of types.
Every proposition that says something
indefinable about one thing is a subject-predicate
proposition, and so on.
Therefore we can recognise a
subject-predicate proposition if we know it
contains only one name and one form, etc. This
gives the construction of types. Hence the type of
a proposition can be recognised by its symbol
alone.
What is essential in a correct
apparent-variable notation is this:- (1) it must
mention a type of propositions; (2) it must show
which components of a proposition of this type are
constants.
(Components are forms and constituents.)
Tale (φ). [x|φ]!x. Then if we describe the
kind of symbols, for which φ! stands and which, by
the above, is enough to determine the type, then
automatically ” (φ). φ! x” cannot be fitted by
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this description, because it CONTAINS ”φ! x” and
the description is to describe ALL that symbolises
in symbols of the φ! kind. If the description is
thus complete vicious circles can just as little
occur as for instance ( φ ). (X) φ (where (X) φ is
a subject-predicate proposition).
122
Item 201a-3 Recto Page 4
- 4 -
First MS
Indefinables are of two sorts: names, and
forms. Propositions cannot consist of names alone;
they cannot be classes of names. A name can not
only occur in two different propositions, but can
occur in the same way in both.
30[Propositions (which are symbols having
reference to facts) are themselves facts: that
this inkpot is on this table may express that I
sit in this chair.]30
It can never express the common
characteristic of two objects that we designate
them by the same name but by two different ways of
designation, for, since names are arbitrary, we
might also choose different names, and where then
would be the common element in the designations?
Nevertheless one is always tempted, in a
difficulty, to take refuge in different ways of
designation.
Frege said ”propositions are names”; Russell
said ”propositions correspond to complexes”. Both
are false; and especially false is the statement
”propositions are names of complexes.”
It is easy to suppose that only such symbols
are complex as contain names of objects, and that
accordingly ” (∃x, φ). φx” or ” (∃x,y). x R y”
must be simple. It is then natural to call the
first of these the name of a form, the second the
name of a relation. But in that case what is the
meaning of (e.g.) ”~(∃x,y). x R y”? Can we put
”not” before a name?
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The reason why ”~Socrates” means nothing is
that ”~x” does not express a property of x.
‹⊗› There are positive and negative facts: if
the proposition ”this rose is not red” is true,
then what it signifies is negative. But the
occurrence of the word ”not” does not indicate
this unless we know that the signification of the
proposition ”this rose is red” (when it is true)
is positive. It is only from both, the negation
and the negated proposition, that we can conclude
to a characteristic of the significance of the
whole proposition. (We are not here speaking of
negations of general propositions, i.e. of such as
contain apparent variables. Negative facts only
justify the negations of atomic propositions.)
‹⊗› Positive and negative facts there are, but
not true and false facts.
‹⊗› If we overlook the fact that propositions
have a sense which is independent of their truth
or falsehood, it easily seems as if true and false
were two equally justified relations between the
sign and what is signified. (We might then say
e.g. that ”q” signifies in the true way what
”not-q” signifies in the false way). But are not
true and false in fact equally justified? Could we
not express ourselves by means of false
propositions just as well as hitherto with true
ones, so long as we know that they are meant
falsely? No! For a proposition is then true when
it is as we assert in this proposition; and
accordingly if by ”q” we mean ”not-q”, and it is
as we mean to assert, then in the new
interpretation ”q” is actually true and not false.
But it is important that we can mean the same by
”q” as by ”not-q”, for it shows that neither to
the symbol ”not” nor to the manner of its
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combination with ”q” does a characteristic of the
denotation of ”q” correspond. ‹Cf. 4.061, 4.062,
4.0621›31
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We must be able to understand propositions
which we have never heard before. But every
proposition is a new symbol. Hence we must have
general indefinable symbols; these are unavoidable
if propositions are not all indefinable. ‹Cf 4.02,
4.021, 4.027›31
Whatever corresponds in reality to compound
propositions must not be more than what
corresponds to their several atomic propositions.
Not only must logic not deal with
(particular) things, but just as little with
relations and predicates.
There are no propositions containing real
variables.
‹⊗› What corresponds in reality to a proposition
depends upon whether it is true or false. But we
must be able to understand a proposition without
knowing if it is true or false. ‹cf. 4.024›31
‹⊗› What we know when we understand a
proposition is this: We know [t|w]hat is the case
if the proposition is true, and what is the case
if it is false. But we do not know (necessarily)
whether it is true or false. ‹cf. 4.024›31
Propositions are not names. ‹cf. 3.144›31
We can never distinguish one logical type
from another by attributing a property to members
of the one which we deny to members of the other.
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‹⊗› Symbols are not what they seem to be. In ”a
R b”, ”R” looks like a substantive, but is not
one. What symbolizes in ”a R b” is that R occurs
between a and b. Hence ”R” is not the indefinable
in ”a R b”. Similarly in ” φ x” ” φ ” looks like a
substantive but is not one; in ”~p” ”~” looks like
” φ ” but is not like it. This is the first thing
that indicates that the re may not be logical
constants. A reason against them is the generality
of logic: logic cannot treat a special set of
things. ‹Cf. 3.1432›31
Molecular propositions contain nothing
beyond what is contained in their atoms; they add
no material information above that contained in
their atoms.
All that is essential about molecular
functions is their T-F schema (i.e the statement
of the cases when they are true and the cases when
they are false).
Alternative indefinability shows that the
indefinables have not been reached.
‹⊗› 30[Every proposition is essentially
true-false: to understand it, we must know both
what must be the case if it is true, and what must
be the case if it is false.]30 Thus a proposition
has two poles, corresponding to the case of its
truth and the case of its falsehood. We call this
the sense of a proposition.
In regard to notation, it is important to
note that not every feature of a symbol
symbolizes. In two molecular functions which have
the same T-F schema, what symbolizes must be the
same. In ”not-not-p”, ”not-p” does not occur; for
”not-not-p” is the same as ”p”, and therefore, if
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”not-p” occurred in ”not-not-p”, it would occur in
”p”.
Logical indefinables cannot be predicates or
relations, because propositions, owing to sense,
cannot have predicates or relations. Nor are ”not”
and ”or”, like judgment, analogous to predicates
or relations, because they do not introduce
anything new.
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Propositions are always complex even if they
contain no names.
30[A proposition must be understood when all
its indefinables are understood. The indefinables
in ”a R b” are introduced as follows:
”a” is indefinable;
”b” is indefinable;
Whatever ”x” and ”y” may mean, ”x R y”
says something indefinable about their meaning.]30
A complex symbol must never be introduced as
a single indefinable. (Thus e.g. no proposition is
indefinable). For if one of its parts occurs also
in another connection, it must there be
re-introduced. And would it then mean the same?
The ways by which we introduce our
indefinables must permit us to construct all
propositions that have sence [? meaning]32 from
these indefinables alone. It is easy to introduce
”all” and ”some” in a way that will make the
construction of [”|(]say) ”(x, y) .x R y” possible
from ”all” and ”x R y” as introduced before.
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An analogy for the theory of truth: Consider
a black patch on white paper; then we can describe
the form of the patch by mentioning, for each
point of the surface, whether it is white or
black. To the fact that a point is black
corresponds a positive fact, to the fact that a
point is white (not black) corresponds a negative
fact. If I designate a point of the surface (one
of Frege’s ”truth-values”), this is as if I set up
an assumption to be decided upon. But in order to
be able to say of a point that it is black or that
it is white, I must first know when a point is to
be called black and when it is to be called white.
In order to be able to say that ”p” is true (or
false), I must first have determined under what
circumstances I call a proposition true, and
thereby I determine the sense of a proposition.
The point in which the analogy fails is this: I
can indicate a point of the paper that is white
and black, but to a proposition without sense
nothing corresponds, for it does not designate a
thing (truth-value), whose properties might be
called ”false” or ”true”; the verb of a
proposition is not ”is true” or ”is false”, as
Frege believes, but what is true must already
contain the verb. ‹See 4.063›31
The comparison of language and reality is
like that of retinal image and visual image: to
the blind spot nothing in the visual image seems
to correspond, and thereby the boundaries of the
blind spot determine the visual image - as true
negations of atomic propositions determine
reality.
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Logical inferences can, it is true, be made
in accordance with Frege’s or Russell’s laws of
deduction, but this cannot justify the inference;
and therefore they are not primitive propositions
of logic. If p follows from q, it can also be
inferred from q, and the ”manner of deduction” is
indifferent. ‹Cf 5.132›31
Those symbols which are called propositions
in which ”variables occur” are in reality not
propositions at all, but only schemes of
propositions, which only become propositions when
we replace the variables by constants. There is no
proposition which is expressed by ”x = x”, for ”x”
has no signification; but there is a proposition
”(x). x = x” and propositions such as ”Socrates =
Socrates” etc.
In books on logic, no variables ought to
occur, but only the general propositions which
justify the use of variables. It follows that the
so-called definitions of logic are not
definitions, but only schemes of definitions, and
instead of these we ought to put general
propositions; and similarly the so-called
primitive ideas (Urzeichen) of logic are not
primitive ideas, but the schemes of them. The
mistaken idea that there are things called facts
or complexes and relations easily leads to the
opinion that there must be a relation of
questioning32 〈proposition 〉 33 to the facts, and
then the question arises whether a relation can
hold between an arbitrary number of things, since
a fact can follow from arbitrary cases. It is a
fact that the proposition which e.g. expresses
that q follows from p and p ⊃ q is this: p.p ⊃ q.⊃
p.q q.
At a pinch, one is tempted to interpret
”not-p” as ”everything34 else, only not p”. That
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from a single fact p an infinity of others,
not-not-p etc., follow, is hardly credible. Man
possesses an innate capacity for constructing
symbols with which some sense can be expressed,
without having the slightest idea what each word
signifies. The best example of this is
mathematics, for man has until lately used the
symbols for numbers without knowing what they
signify or that they signify nothing. ‹Cf. 5.43›31
Russell’s ”complexes” were to have the
useful property of being compounded, and were to
combine with this the agreeable
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property that they could be treated like
”simples”. But this alone made them unserviceable
as logical types, since there would have been
significance in asserting, of a simple, that it
was complex. But a property cannot be a logical
type.
Every statement about apparent complexes can
be resolved into the logical sum of a statement
about the constituents and a statement about the
proposition which describes the complex
completely. How, in each case, the resolution is
to be made, is an important question, but its
answer is not unconditionally necessary for the
construction of logic. ‹Cf 2.0201›31
That ”or” and ”not” etc. are not relations
in the same sense as ”right” and ”left” etc., is
obvious to the plain man. The possibility of
cross-definitions in the old logical indefinables
shows, of itself, that these are not the right
indefinables, and, even more conclusively, that
they do not denote relations. ‹See
31 5.42›31
If we change a constituent a35 of a
proposition φ (a) into a variable, then there is a
class
p^ [( ∃ x). φ (x) = p] .
This class in general still depends upon what, by
an arbitrary convention, we mean by ”φ (x)”. But
if we change into variables all those symbols
whose significance was arbitrarily determined,
there is still such a class. But this is now not
dependent upon any convention, but only upon the
nature of the symbol ”φ (x)”. It corresponds to a
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logical type. ‹Cf 3.315›31
Types can never be distinguished from each
other by saying (as is often done) that one has
these but the other has those properties, for this
presupposes that there is a meaning in asserting
all these properties of both types. But from this
it follows that, at best, these properties may be
types, but certainly not the objects of which they
are asserted. ‹[See|Cf36] 4.124›31
At a pinch we are always inclined to
explanations of logical functions of propositions
which aim at introducing into the functions either
only the constituents of these propositions, or
only their form, etc. etc.; and we overlook that
ordinary language would not contain the whole
propositions if it did not need them: However,
e.g., ”not-p” may be explained, there must always
be a meaning given to the question ”what is
denied?”
The very possibility of Frege’s explanations
of ”not-p” and ”if p then q”, from which it
follows that ”not-not-p” denotes the same as p,
makes it probable that there is some method of
designation in which ”not-not-p” corresponds to
the same symbol as ”p”. But if this method of
designation suffices for logic, it must be the
right one.
‹⊗› Names are points, propositions arrows - they
have sense. The sense of a proposition is
determined by the two poles true and false. The
form of a proposition is like a straight line,
which divides all points of a plane into right and
left. The line does this automatically, the form
of proposition only by convention. See 3.144
31
Just as little as we are concerned, in
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logic, with the relation of a name to its meaning,
just so little are we concerned with the relation
of a proposition to reality, but we want to know
the meaning of names and the sense of propositions
as we introduce an ind[f|e]finable concept ”A” by
saying: ”’A’ denotes something indefinable”, so we
introduce e.g. the form of propositions a R b by
saying: ”For all meanings of ”x” and ”y”, ”x R y”
expresses something indefinable about x and y”.
In place of every proposition ”p[2|”], let
us write ”ab p”. Let every correlation of
propositions to each other or of names to
135
Item 201a-3 Recto Page 9
- 9 -
propositions be effected by a correlation of their
poles ”a” and ”b”. Let this correlation be
transitive. Then accordingly ”a-ab-b p” is the
same symbol as ”ab p”. Let n propositions be
given. I then call a ”class of poles” of these
propositions every class of n members, of which
each is a pole of one of the n propositions, so
that one member corresponds to each proposition. I
then correlate with each class of poles one of two
poles (a and b). The sense of the symbolizing fact
thus constructed I cannot define, but I know it.
If p = not-not-p etc., this shows that the
traditional method of symbolism is wrong, since it
allows a plurality of symbols with the same sense;
and thence it follows that, in analyzing such
propositions, we must not be guided by Russell’s
method of symbolizing.
It is to be remembered that names are not
things, but classes: ”A” is the same letter as
”A”. This has the most important consequences for
every symbolic language. ‹See 3.203›31
Neither the sense nor the meaning of a
proposition is a thing. These words are incomplete
symbols.
It is impossible to dispense with
propositions in which the same argument occurs in
different positions. It is obviously useless to
replace φ (a, a) by φ (a, b). a = b.
Since the ab-functions of p are again
bi-polar propositions, we can form ab-functions of
them, and so on. In this way a series of
propositions will arise, in which in general the
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symbolizing facts will be the same in several
members. If now we find an ab-function of such a
kind that by repeated application of it every
ab-function can be generated, then we can
introduce the totality of ab-functions as the
totality of those that are generated by
application of this function. Such a function is
~p ∨ ~q.
It is easy to suppose a contradiction in the
fact that on the one hand every possible complex
proposition is a simple ab-function of simple
propositions, and that on the other hand the
repeated application of one ab-function suffices
to generate all these propositions. If e.g. an
affirmation can be generated by double negation,
is negation in any sense contained in affirmation?
Does ”p” deny ”not-p” or assert ”p”, or both? And
how do matters stand with the definition of ”⊃” by
”∨” and ”[.|~]”, or of ”∨” by ”[.|~]” and ”⊃”? And
how e.g. shall we introduce p/q (i.e. ~p ∨ ~q) if
not by saying that this expression says something
indefinable about all arguments p and q? But the
ab-functions must be introduced as follows: The
function p/q is merely a mechanical instrument for
constructing all possible symbols of ab-functions.
The symbols arising by repeated application of the
symbol ” | ” do not contain the symbol ”p|q”. We
need a rule according to which we can form all
symbols of ab-functions, in order to be able to
speak of the class of them; and we now speak of
them e.g. as those symbols of functions which can
be generated by repeated application of the
operation ” | ”. And we say now: For all p’s and
q’s, ”p|q” says something indefinable about the
sense of those simple propositions which are
contained in p and q. ‹See 5.44›31
The assertion-sign is logically quite
without significance. It only shows, in Frege and
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Whitehead and Russell, that these authors hold the
propositions so indicated to be true. ” ”
therefore belongs as little to the proposition as
(say) the number of the proposition. A proposition
cannot possibly assert of itself that it is true.
‹See 4.42›31
Every right theory of judgment must make it
impossible for me to judge that this table
penholders the book. Russell’s theory does not
satisfy this requirement. ‹5.5422›31
‹⊗› It is clear that we understand propositions
without knowing
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whether they are true or false. But we can only
know the meaning of a proposition when we know if
it is true or false. What we understand is the
sense of the proposition. ‹Cf 4.024›31
The assumption of the existence of logical
objects makes it appear remarkable that in the
sciences propositions of the form ”p ∨ q”, ”p ⊃
q”, etc. are only then not provisional when ” ∨ ”
and ” ⊃ ” stand within the scope of a
generality-sign (apparent variable).
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If we formed all possible atomic
propositions, the world would be completely
described if we declared the truth or falsehood of
each. I doubt this. R? DS. ‹See31 4.26.›31
‹⊗› The chief characteristic of my theory is
that, in it, p has the same meaning as not-p. ‹Cf
4.0621›31
A false theory of relations makes it easily
seem as if the relation of fact and constituent
were the same as that of fact and fact which
follows from it. But the similarity of the two may
be expressed thus: φ a. ⊃ (ϕ,a) a = a.
If a word created32s31 a world so that in it
the principles of logic are true, it thereby
creates a world in which the whole of mathematics
holds; and similarly it could not create a world
in which a proposition was true, without creating
its constituents. Cf 5.123
31
Signs of the form ”p ∨ ~p” are senseless,
but not the propositions ”(p). p ∨ ~p”. If I know
that this rose is either red or not red, I know
nothing. The same holds of all ab-functions. Cf
4.461
31
To understand a proposition means to know
what is the case if it is true. Hence we can
understand it without knowing if it is true. We
understand it when we understand its constituents
and forms. If we know the meaning of ”a” and ”b”,
and if we know what ”x R y” means for all x”s and
y’s, then we also understand ”a R b”. Cf 4.024
31
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I understand the proposition ”a R b” when I
know that either the fact that a R b or the fact
that not a R b corresponds to it; but this is not
to be confused with the false opinion that I
understood ”a R b” when I know that ”a R b or not
a R b” is the case.
But the form of a proposition symbolizes in
the following way: Let us consider symbols of the
form ”x R y”; to these correspond primarily pairs
of objects, of which one has the name ”x”, the
other the name ”y”. The x’s and y’s stand in
various relations to each other, among others the
relation R holds between some, but not between
others. I now determine the sense of ”x R y” by
laying down: when the facts behave in regard to ”x
R y” so that the meaning of ”x” stands in the
relation R to the meaning of ”y”, then I say that
they (the facts) are ”of like sense”
(”gleichsinnig”) with the proposition ”x R y”;
otherwise, ”of opposite sense” (entgegengesetzt”);
I correlate the facts to the symbol ”x R y” by
thus dividing them into those of like sense and
those of opposite sense. To this correlation
corresponds the correlation of name and meaning.
Both are psychological. Thus I understand the form
”x R y” when I know that it discriminates the
behaviour of x and y according as these stand in
the relation R or not. In this way I extract from
all possible relations the relation R, as, by a
name, I extract its meaning from among all
possible things.
Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to say:
we understand the proposition p when we know that
’”p” is true’ ≡ p; for this would naturally always
be the case if accidentally the propositions to
right and left of the symbol ”≡” were both true or
both false. We require not only an equivalence,
but a formal equivalence, which is bound up with
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the introduction of the form of p.
The sense of an ab-function of p is a
function of the sense of p. ‹See 5.2341›31
The ab-functions use the discrimination of
facts, which their arguments bring forth, in order
to generate new discriminations.
Only facts can express sense, a class of
names cannot. This is easily shown. ‹See 3.142›31
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There is no thing which is the form of a
proposition, and no name which is the name of a
form. Accordingly we can also not say that a
relation which in certain cases holds between
things holds sometimes between forms and things.
This goes against Russell’s theory of judgment.
‹X› It is very easy to forget that, though the
propositions of a form can be either true or
false, each one of these propositions can only be
either true or false[.|,] not both
This was typed in but has excesses through
it. (D.S.)
Among the facts which make ”p or q” true,
there are some which make ”p and q” true; but the
class which makes ”p or q” true is different from
the class which makes ”p and q” true; and only
this is what matters. For we introduce this class,
as it were, when we introduce ab-functions. ‹Cf
5.1241›31
A very natural objection to the way in which
I have introduced e.g. propositions of the form x
R y is that by it propositions such as (∃ x. y). x
R y and similar ones are not explained, which yet
obviously have in common with a R b what c R d has
in commonx with a R b. But when we introduced
propositions of the form x R y we mentioned no one
particular proposition of this form; and we only
need to introduce (∃x, y). φ (x, y) for all φ’s in
any way which makes the sense of these
propositions dependent on the sense of all
propositions of the form φ (a, b), and thereby the
justness of our procedure is proved.
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The indefinables of logic must be
independent of each other. If an indefinable is
introduced, it must be introduced in all
combinations in which it can occur. We cannot
therefore introduce it first for one combination,
then for another; e.g., if the form x R y has been
introduced, it must henceforth be understood in
propositions of the form a R b just in the same
way as in propositions such as (∃x, y). x R y and
others. We must not introduce it first for one
class of cases, then for the other; for it would
remain doubtful if its meaning was the same in
both cases, and there would be no ground for using
the same manner of combining symbols in both
cases. In short, for the introduction of
indefinable symbols and combinations of symbols
the same holds, mutatis mutandis, that Frege has
said for the introduction of symbols by
definitions. Cf 5.451
31
It is a priori likely that the introduction
of atomi[x|c] propositions is fundamental for the
understanding of all other kinds of propositions.
In fact the understanding of general propositions
obviously depends on that of atomic propositions.
Cross-definability in the realm of general
propositions leads to quite similar questions to
those in the realm of ab-functions.
When we say ”A believes p”, this sounds, it
is true, as if here we could substitute a proper
name for ”p”; but we can see that here a sense,
not a meaning, is concerned, if we say ”A believes
that ’p’ is true”; and in order to make the
direction of p even more explicit, we might say ”A
believes that ’p’ is true and ’not-p’ is false”.
Here the bi-polarity of p is expressed and it
seems that we shall only be able to express the
proposition ”A believes p” correctly by the
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ab-notation; say by making ”A” have a relation to
the poles ”a” and ”b” of a-p-b.
The epistemological questions concerning the
nature of judgment and belief cannot be solved
without a correct apprehension of the form of the
proposition.
The ab-notation shows the dependence of or
and not, and thereby that they are not to be
employed as simultaneous indefinables.
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Not: ”The complex sign ”a R b’” says that a
stands in the relation R to b; but that ’a’ stands
in a certain relation to ’b’ says that a R b.
‹3.143›31
In philosophy there are no deductions: it is
purely descriptive.
Philosophy gives no pictures of reality.
Philosophy can neither confirm nor confute
scientific investigation. ‹Cf 4.111›31
Philosophy consists of logic and
metaphysics: logic is its basis.
Epistemology is the philosophy of
psychology. ‹See 4.1126›31
Distrust of grammar is the first requisite
for philosophizing.
Propositions can never be indefinables, for
they are always complex. That also words like
”ambulo” are complex appears in the fact that
their root with a different termination gives a
different sense. ‹4.032›31 Crossed out but
originally typed in. (D.S.)
Only the doctrine of general indefinables
permits us to understand the nature of functions.
Neglect of this doctrine leads to an impenetrable
thicket.
Philosophy is the doctrine of the logical
form of scientific propositions (not only of
primitive propositions). ‹Cf 4.113›31
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The word ”philosophy” ought always to
designate something over or under but not beside,
the natural sciences. ‹See 4.111›31
‹ › Judgment, command and question all stand on
the same level; but all have in common the
propositional form, which does interest us.
‹ › The structure of the proposition must be
recognized, the rest comes of itself. But ordinary
language conceals the structure of the
proposition: in it, relations look like
predicates, predicates like names, etc. ‹Cf
4.002›31
Facts cannot be named. ‹See 3.144›31
It is easy to suppose that ”individual”,
”particular”, ”complex” @.. etc. are primitive
ideas of logic. Russell e.g. says ”individual” and
”matrix” are ”primitive ideas”. This error
presumably is to be explained by the fact that, by
employment of variables instead of the
generality-sign, it come s to seem as if logic
dealt with things which have been deprived of all
properties except thing-hood, and with
propositions deprived of all properties except
complexity. We forget that the indefinables of
symbols (Urbilder von Zeichen) only occur under
the generality-sign, never outside it.
Just as people used to struggle to bring all
propositions into the subject-predicate form, so
now it is natural to conceive every proposition as
expressing a relation, which is just as incorrect.
What is justified in this desire is fully
satisfied by Russell’s theory of manufactured
relations.
〈 wrong termed? 〉 33
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One of the most natural attempts at solution
consists in regarding ”not-p” as ”the opposite of
p”, where then ”opposite” would be the indefinable
relation. But it is easy to see that every such
attempt to replace the ab-functions by
descriptions must fail.
The false assumption that propositions are
names leads us to believe that there must be
logical objects: for the meanings of logical
propositions will have to be such things.
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A correct explanation of logical
propositions must give them a unique position as
against all other propositions. ‹6.12›31
No proposition can say anything about
itself, because the symbol of the proposition
cannot be contained in itself; this must be the
basis of the theory of logical types. ‹Cf 3.332›31
Every proposition which says something
indefinable about a thing is a subject-predicate
proposition; every proposition which says
something indefinable about two things expresses a
dual relation between these things, and so on.
Thus every proposition which contains only one
name and one indefinable form is a
subject-predicate proposition, and so on. An
indefinable simple symbol can only be a name, and
therefore we can know, by the symbol of an atomic
proposition, whether it is a subject-predicate
proposition.
149
‹This is the symbol for ~p ∨ ~q ›31
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